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U.S. UNCONSCIONABILITY AND ARTICLE 1171
I. OVERVIEW OF ARTICLE 1171 AND ITS ANTECEDENTS IN THE
FRENCH CODES
On February 10, 2016, French President Frangois Hollande approved a
comprehensive reform of parts of the French Civil Code, including its
general principles of contract law in Book III, Title III of the Code.' To
avoid the gridlock that likely would accompany debate on each provision if
drafted by legislators, the French Parliament had earlier authorized the
executive branch to prepare and adopt revisions in the form of an
ordonnance2 pursuant to a procedure set forth in article 38 of the French
Constitution. The French Ministry of Justice took the lead in preparing the
reform,4 which became effective in October 2016.
The goals of the reform are stated in the legislation authorizing executive
lawmaking: to modernize, clarify, reorganize, and simplify the law; to
improve the law's readability; and to make the law more accessible.6
Although modernization of the iconic 1804 Napoleonic Code might strike
some as an exceedingly bold enterprise, Guillaume Meunier, an official in
the Ministry of Justice and an active participant in the reform process,
responded by asking, "who could understand that, in 2012, a commercial or
civilian relationship is ruled by provisions mostly written in 1804?" A
1 Ordonnance 2016-131 du 10 fdvrier 2016 portant riforme du droit des contrats, du
r6gime g6ndral et de la prevue des obligations [Ordinance 2016-131 of 10 February 2016 to
reform the law of contracts, the general regime and the proof of obligations], JOURNAL
OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANCAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF
FRANCE], Feb. 11, 2016, p. 26 [hereinafter Ordonnance].
2 Loi 2015-177 du 16 f6vrier 2015 relative A la modernisation et A la simplification du droit et
des proc6dures dans les domaines de la justice et des affaires int6rieures (1) [Law 2015-177 of 16
February 2015 on the Modernization and Simplification of the Law and Procedures in the Fields
of Justice and Home Affairs (1)], J.O., Feb. 17, 2015, p. 2961, art. 8 [hereinafter Loi].
3 1958 Const. art. 38 (Fr.) (permitting the executive branch to petition the Parliament for
permission to enact law by ordinance, which would remain in force for only a limited time
unless adopted by Parliament).
4 For a thorough description of the process of consultation and revision, see Guillaume
Meunier, The Reform of the Law of Obligations in France: Methods and Prospects, in
REFORMING THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS AND COMPANY LAW: STUDIES IN FRENCH AND GERMAN
LAW 15 (Walter Doralt & Olivier Deshayes eds., 2013).
Ordonnance, supra note 1, art. 9.
6 See Loi, supra note 2, art. 8. Clarity and accessibility of the law are values of
constitutional stature in France. See Meunier, supra note 4, at 15.
7 Meunier, supra note 4, at 15.
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successful modernization of the code could encourage traders to choose
French contract law' as the governing law in international transactions.9
Regarding the need for clarification of code provisions, Meunier notes
that two hundred years of judicial interpretations of the 1804 Code have
added substance to the Code's general provisions, but that full meaning
cannot be gleaned by reading the Code alone: "Pretending to understand the
French law of obligations by reading the 1804 Code is like pretending to
sense the taste of a peach by eating its stone." 0
Consequently, it is not surprising that many of the revisions codify
judicial interpretations that had previously added clarity and specificity to
general provisions of the 1804 Code." Provisions in the reformed code
extending the duty of good faith to the negotiation process, for example,
codify existing judicial interpretations. 2  The reform also reflects the
8 Under an EU regulation commonly known as "Rome I," courts within the European
Union will liberally enforce the parties' contractual choice of the contract law that will govern
any disputes arising out of their contract. Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 on the Law Applicable to Contractual
Obligations (Rome I), 2008 O.J. (L 177/6) art. 3. In the United States, the Uniform
Commercial Code [hereinafter the UCC in text or U.C.C. in citations] honors party choice of
law in sales of goods, but only if the parties have chosen the law of a state or nation with a
"reasonable relation" to the transaction. U.C.C. § 1-301 (2001). With some limitations,
courts in the U.S. will also honor party choice in non-sales contracts. See generally
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS 187 (1988); see also M/S Bremen v. Zapata
Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 8-19 & n.15 (1972) (in the exercise of admiralty jurisdiction,
enforcing party choice of forum, and by extension that forum's law, even though the chosen
forum had no relation to the transaction or the parties).
9 Michel S6jean, The French Reform of Contracts: An Opportunity to Tie Together the
Community of Civil Lawyers, 76 LA. L. REv. 1151, 1151-54, 1159-61 (2016) (referring to
stated goal of the French Ministry, but opining that the Ministry will best increase the
influence of the new code through translation into other languages, especially English, and
providing rich web resources); Taylor Wessing, French reform of contract law - a first
analysis of the impact of the reform on franchise and distribution networks, LEXOLOGY (Feb.
23, 2016), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g-3761ebO3-8ba6-4a02-b02f-33ba2b
aea2cb (identifying the goal of increasing the attractiveness of French law by updating and
siTlifying it).Meunier, supra note 4, at 15.
" See, e.g., Luc Grynbaum, French Civil Code Reform on Contract Law, MENA Bus. L.
REv. 73, 74 (2016) (regarding a line of provisions beginning with art. 1130, stating that "case
law has been embodied in the new French texts" on issues of consent); Peter Rosher, French
Contract Law Reform, 17 Bus. L. INT'L 59, 72 (2016) (concluding that the reform largely
"seeks to codify rules developed by case law over the years"); Wessing, supra note 9
(asserting that "a large majority" of the new provisions in the reform are unsurprising because
they codify principles previously established in case law).Rosher, supra note 11, at 69-70 (referring to articles 1103 and 1111 in an early version
of the reform, which are articles 1104 and 1112 in the final version).
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influence of nonbinding sources of contract rules and principles promulgated
in the effort to harmonize European contract law. 13
However, two innovations in the reform appear, at least at first glance, to
be influenced in part by U.S. law. Article 1195 of the reformed code, for
example, introduces a new default rule of commercial impracticability
similar to that in U.S. law, 14 except that it permits a court to revise or
terminate the contract if the parties fail to accomplish either of those
resolutions by agreement.15
Even more controversial to many observers is new article 1171,16 which
invites comparisons to the unconscionability doctrine in the United States.17
Article 1171 empowers a judge to strike out an unfair term that creates a
significant imbalance between the parties, but only in a standard form
contract, and only if the imbalance is caused by a term other than the price or
other main obligation of a party:
Article 1171. - Any term of a standard form contract which
creates a significant imbalance in the rights and obligations of
the parties to the contract is deemed not written.
The assessment of significant imbalance must not concern
either the main subject-matter of the contract nor the adequacy
of the price in relation to the act of performance.' 8
13 Meunier, supra note 4, at 16; Grynbaum, supra note 11, at 75 (concluding that "this
French reform of Contract Law has converged with the evolution seen in European Law");
S6jean, supra note 9, at 1157 (asserting that the reform is influenced by European contract
principles to a greater degree than it will be influential internationally).
14 See U.C.C. § 2-615 (2011); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261 (1981).
15 CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] [Civil Code] art. 1195 (Fr. rev. 2016). For an English translation
solicited by the French Ministry of Justice, see JOHN CARTWRIGHT, BtNtDICTE FAUVARQUE-
CossoN & SIMON WHITTAKER, THE LAW OF CONTRACT, THE GENERAL REGIME OF
OBLIGATIONS, AND PROOF OF OBLIGATIONS: THE NEW PROVISIONS OF THE CODE CIVIL
CREATED BY ORDONNANCE NO 2016-131 OF 10 FEBRUARY 2016 TRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH 18,
art. 1195 (2016), http://www.textes.justice.gouv.fr/art-pix/THE-LAW-OF-CONTRACT-2-5-
16.pdf, [hereinafter REFORM IN ENGLISH].
See Rosher, supra note 11 (referring to art. 1169 (later renumbered art. 1171) as "one of
the most debated changes introduced by the reform"); EBA Endr6s-Baum Associds, A
necessary yet delicate reform of French contract law, 1, 1 (2015), http://www.eba-avocats.
com/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/EN Note-r6forme-du-droit-des-contrats-et-des-obligations.
pdf ("This is certainly one of the most debated points of the reform: the fact that the notion of
'sigificant imbalance' is not clearly defined is frightening.") [hereinafter EBA].
See U.C.C. § 2-302 (2011); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1981).
18 REFORM IN ENGLISH, supra note 15, at 14, art. 1171. The official French text of this
provision reads:
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The celebrated element of cause9 in the original Code had become the
20
repository for several validity requirements, including a limited judicial
mechanism for policing significantly unfair terms. 2 1 The reform eliminates
the concept of cause, leaving room for article 1171 and other code provisions
22to more directly regulate abusive contract terms.
Although the term cause may be sufficiently broad and multi-faceted to
encompass matters of validity,23 article 1171 much more clearly and
explicitly grants French magistrates the authority to strike out a contractual
Art. 1171.-Dans un contrat d'adhision, toute clause qui cr6e un ddsdquilibre
significatif entre les droits et obligations des parties au contrat est rdput6e non
6crite.
L'appr6ciation du d6s6quilibre significatifne porte ni sur l'objet principal du
contrat ni sur I'ad6quation du prix A la prestation.
C. Civ. art. 1171 (Fr. rev. 2016).
19 C. civ. art. 1108 (Fr. 2015) (requiring a "cause licite" as one of four essential elements of a
valid contract); THE FRENCH CIvIL CODE art. 1108 (John H. Crabb trans., rev. ed., Rothman
1995) [hereinafter Crabb trans.] (translating "cause licite" to mean a cause that is licit or lawful).
20 E.g., supra note 19 (original art. 1108 explicitly requires the cause to be "licite," or
lawful); BARRY NICHOLAS, THE FRENCH LAW OF CONTRACT 120-22, 125-26 (2d ed. 1992)
(referring to cases of the Cour de cassation finding absence of cause when, unknown to one or
both parties, the subject matter of a contract or a central reason for contracting had ceased to
exist at the time of contracting, or when one party seeks to excuse his performance because
the other party has failed to perform).
21 See, e.g., Ruth Sefton-Green, A Vision of Social Justice in French Private Law:
Paternalism and Solidarity, in THE MANY CONCEPTS OF SOCIAL JUSTICE IN EUROPEAN PRIVATE
LAW 237, 241-42 & n.27 (H.W. Micklitz ed., 2011) (critically assessing "cause cases" in
which "the Cour de cassation has approved annulling contracts which appear to be
substantively imbalanced or unjust"). In a much more specific manner, the Civil Code also
regulates imbalances in bargains through the doctrine of lesion, but only in limited contexts,
such as a vendor receiving a price for real property 7/12 less than its value. C. CIV. art. 1674
(Fr. 2015).
22 See Rosher, supra note 11, at 68 ("It may be that new article 1169 [now art. 1171] will be
used to cover cases previously decided on the grounds of absence of cause (which will now
disappear from the Civil Code)."); cf Rafael Amaro, Le disdquilibre significatif en droit
commun des contrats ou les incertitudes d'une double filiation, CONTRATS CONC. CONSOM.,
2014/8-9, 6tude 8, pp. 5, 7-8, § 12 (in analyzing an early draft of art. 1171, doubting whether
art. 1171 could fill the gap left by the concept of cause in light of art. 1171's exclusion of a
significant imbalance relating to the main obligations of the parties); see also infra notes 30-
44 (discussing other provisions of French law that regulate unfair or excessive contract terms).
23 See supra notes 19-21. Most fundamentally, "cause" in the original code referred to the
"motivating reason or purpose" for entering into a contract. NICHOLAS, supra note 20, at 118.
In addition, art. 1108 explicitly required the cause to be "licite," which by code definition
authorized courts to police bargains for violations of law, good morals, or public policy.
Crabb trans., supra note 19, art. 1133 (translating the Civil Code article that defines "illicit");
see NICHOLAS, supra note 20, at 128-36. Invoking the concept of "cause" to police unfair
bargains might find legislative grounding in the reference to "good morals or public policy,"
but only through creative judicial application.
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term if it fails a test of fairness.2 4 It thus more directly and openly raises
questions of whether the effort to modernize the Code, partly by protecting
weaker parties,25 unduly sacrifices values of certainty, individual autonomy,
and freedom of contract.26 If those questions are not answered satisfactorily,
article 1171 could undermine the reform's goal to make French law an
attractive option27 for international transactions.28
Still, article 1171 is not entirely unprecedented in French law. The
groundwork for article 1171 was laid by other French code provisions that
implement European Union directiveS29 and, to a modest degree, by
amendments to article 1152 of the original Civil Code.
After amendments in 1975 and 1985, article 1152 of the original Civil
Code authorized a judge to reduce a manifestly excessive contractual penalty
clause or increase a manifestly inadequate liquidated damages clause, on
request by a party or on the judge's own motion.30 As amended, article 1152
24 See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
25 Rosher, supra note 11, at 59 (stating that the reform has been "[p]romoted as an
opportunity to protect the weaker party"); EBA, supra note 16, at 1 (objective of the reform is
to clarify general principles and protect the weaker party).
26 For an introductory discussion of these values in the context of the pre-reform French
Civil Code, see Charles R. Calleros, Toward Harmonization and Certainty in Choice-of-Law
Rules for International Contracts: Should the U.S. Adopt the Equivalent of Rome I?, 28 Wis.
INT'L L.J. 639, 641-43 (2011).
27 See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
28 See, e.g., Rosher, supra note 11, at 68 (warning that traders began to choose Swiss law
after Germany adopted an approach similar to that of article 1169, now article 1171); EBA,
supra note 16, at 2 ("Thus, the impossibility of predicting judicial interventions can lead to an
ultimate disinterest in French law from an international business-law point of view.").
29 See, e.g., CHRISTIAN TWIGG-FLESNER, THE EUROPEANISATION OF CONTRACT LAW 10, 19-
20 (2d ed. 2013) (summarizing EU lawmaking structures and reviewing EU directives relating
to consumer protection and abusive practices between commercial enterprises); Tamas Dezso
Ziegler, The Myths We Built Around EU Consumer Law, in HUNGARIAN YEARBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND EUROPEAN LAW 2015, at 377-402 (2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract
t-2678904 (critiquing EU consumer law). Unlike an EU regulation, which imposes a uniform
rule on member states, an EU directive fosters general harmonization of national laws by
requiring member states to change their laws to meet EU norms, with the details of specific
letislation left to each member state. TWIGG-FLESNER, supra, at 29.
See Charles R. Calleros, Punitive Damages, Liquidated Damages, and Clauses Pinales
in Contract Actions: A Comparative Analysis of the American Common Law and the French
Civil Code, 32 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 67, 104-08 (2006). Together, the two amendments added
the following language: "Ngan moins, le juge peut, meme d'office, moddrer ou augmenter la
peine qui avait et conve nue, si elle est manifestement excessive ou dirisoire. Toute
stipulation contraire sera rdputie non crite." C. cIv. art. 1152 (Fr., as amended 1985).
Professor Crabb translates this passage to read: "Nevertheless, the judge, even on his own
motion, may moderate or increase the penalty which had been agreed upon, if it is manifestly
excessive or pitiful. Any contrary stipulation will be considered not written." Crabb Trans.,
supra note 19, art. 1152. For a broader discussion of article 1152, see infra notes 128-36 and
accompanying text. In the newly reformed French Civil Code, the provisions of former article
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did not provide a test for assessing whether stipulated damages were
"manifestly excessive or pitiful," 31 and the amendments left the magnitude of
any adjustment in damages to the discretion of the judge.32 Consequently,
amended article 1152 represented a significant allocation of authority to the
judiciary, but only in the context of two narrow issues regarding stipulated
damages.
Somewhat more broadly, article L. 132-1 of the French Consumer Code3 3
has declared for more than two decades that ancillary terms3 4 of a consumer
contract are invalid if they create a significant imbalance between the parties'
rights and obligations to the detriment of the consumer. However,
regulation under article L. 132-1 has expressly relied on an administratively
produced list of presumptively unfair terms.36 Consequently, article 1171 of
1152 now appear in article 1231-5. This Article, however, retains its reference to article 1152,
because it analyzes its evolution prior to the reform.
31 Crabb trans., supra note 19, art. 1152.
32 See Calleros, supra note 30, at 105-08.
33 Effective in July 2016, the French Consumer Code has been reorganized. In the
recodification, the equivalent of art. L. 132-1 can be found at CODE DE LA CONSUMMATION
[CONSUMER CODE], arts. L212-1, L241-1 (Fr. 2016), https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCo
de.dojsessionid=AEC9692AA2FCOCE65538486CE5C32C17.tpdila07v_1?cidTexte=LEGIT
EXT000006069565&dateTexte=20160719 [hereinafter C. CONS.]. For purposes of examining
the consumer code as an antecedent to new Civil Code art. 1171, however, this Journal Article
refers to the codification in force prior to February 2016, and it thus refers to C. CoNs. art. L.
132-1 (Fr. 2015).
34 Like article 1171, Consumer Code art. L. 132-1 has regulated only unfair terms other
than the price or other main obligation, to the extent that the clauses are written in a clear or
understandable manner:
L'appr6ciation du caractbre abusif des clauses au sens du premier alina ne
porte ni sur la d6finition de l'objet principal du contrat ni sur l'addquation du
prix ou de la r6mundration au bien vendu ou au service offert pour autant que
les clauses soient r6digdes de fagon claire et comprdhensible.
C. CONs. art. L. 132-1, ¶ 7 (Fr. 2015).
35 The first paragraph of article L. 132-1 provides:
Dans les contrats conclus entre professionnels et non-professionnels ou
consommateurs, sont abusives les clauses qui ont pour objet ou pour effet de
crder, au d6triment du non-professionnel ou du consommateur, un
disdquilibre significatifentre les droits et obligations des parties au contrat.
Id. ¶ 1 (italics added to emphasize the standard of "significant imbalance between the rights
and obligations of the parties"). Article L. 132-1 implemented the EU Unfair Contract Terms
Directive. Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer
contracts, 1993 O.J. (L 095) 29-34 (in English) [hereinafter EU DIR. 93/13], http://eur-lex.eu
roa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri-CELEX:31993L0013:en:HTML.
6 The second paragraph of this article provides:
Un d&ret en Conseil d'Etat, pris aprbs avis de la commission institude A
Particle L. 534-1, ditermine une liste de clauses prisumdes abusives ; en cas
de litige concemant un contrat comportant une telle clause, le professionnel
doit apporter la preuve du caractbre non abusif de la clause litigieuse.
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the new Civil Code on its face allocates greater discretion and responsibility
to the judiciary than the Consumer Code.37
A more expansive predecessor to article 1171 is French Commercial
Code article L. 442-6, which regulates abusive practices in transactions
between professionals.3 8 Unlike article L. 132-1 of the Consumer Code,
article L. 442-6 does not limit judicial assessment to auxiliary terms.
Instead, it authorizes judicial actions40 to redress the statutorily prohibited
action of "subjecting a business partner to obligations that create a significant
imbalance in the rights and obligations of the parties,"A1 and it specifically
regulates abusive terms relating to the price or a party's main obligation.42
Moreover, although a Commission d'examen des pratiques commerciales
(CEPC) issues recommendations regarding commercial practices,4 3 and
though the CEPC has analyzed and summarized previous judicial
applications of the significant imbalance standard," it has not provided its
own original guidance about this standard.
In light of the expansive judicial intervention authorized by article L. 442-
6 of the Commercial Code regarding contracts between professionals, one
might wonder why article 1171 of the reform would renew debates about
judicially imposed limits on freedom of contract.4 5 Part of the answer might
C. CONS. art. L. 132-1, ¶ 2 (italics added to emphasize the determination of a list of
presumptively abusive clauses by decree of the Council of State). The EU Directive also
contains such a list. EU DIR. 93/13, supra note 35, art. 3.3 & Annex.
37 See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text.
38 Code de commerce [Commercial Code] art. L. 442-6 (Fr., 2015) [hereinafter C. com.].
For an English translation, see THE FRENCH COMMERCIAL CODE IN ENGLISH, 2015-16 EDITION
436-39, art. L. 442-6 (Philip Raworth trans., 2015-2016 ed.) [hereinafter Raworth trans.].
39 See supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
4 C. coM. art. L. 442-6, III (Fr. 2015) (authorizing enforcement actions by interested
private parties or specified government officials). A Paris law firm's newsletter reports on
actions to enforce art. L. 442-6 from 2009 to 2011. August & Debousy Avocats,
Clarifications on the concept of a significant imbalance and more questions hanging over the
Minister of the Economy's actions, COMMERCIAL AND DISTRIBUTION LAW NEWSFLASH No. 37
(Jan. 2012), http://www.august-debouzy.com/en/blog/897-commercial-and-distribution-law-
newsflash.
41 C. COM. art. L. 442-6, I 20 (Fr. 2015).
42 Id. arts. L. 442-6, 110, L. 442-6, I 4'. For example, subarticle 10 prohibits a trader from the
seeking or securing of an advantage from a business partner that is "manifestly disproportionate
to the value of the service provided." Raworth trans., supra note 38, at 436.
43 See C. CoMm. art. L. 440-1 (establishing tasks and rules for the CEPC).
4 See, e.g., CEPC, "Avis no15-03 relatif A une demande d'avis portant sur l'existence d'un
dds6quilibre significatif dans les droits et obligations des parties, dans le cadre de contrats
sign6s par des professionnels pour la cr6ation de site internet" (17/4/2015), http://www.
economie.gouv.fr/cepc/avis-ndegl5-03-relatif-a-demande-davis-portant-sur-lexistence-dun-de
se~uilibre-significatif (summarizing analysis of the Court of Appeal of Paris).
See supra note 16.
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lie in the view, held by some, that the French Civil Code should stand apart
from other codes as a source of general guiding principles.4 6 Moreover, two
of the general principles reflected in the Civil Code-freedom of contract 7
and limited authority granted to judges48-are inevitably compromised by a
provision that grants judges authority to strike down unfair contract terms
without the administrative guidance established in Consumer Code article L.
132-1 or even the recommendations of the Commission described in
Commercial Code article L. 440-1. Viewed in this context, one could predict
fresh controversy. The reform apparently took inspiration from detailed
provisions of the Consumer and Commercial Codes to fashion a more
general tool in the Civil Code for judicial policing of abusive terms.49
46 See, e.g., Mustapha Mekki, The General Principles of Contract Law in the
"Ordonnance" on the Reform of Contract Law, 76 LA. L. REv. 1193, 1199 (2016) (presenting
this view under the heading of "exogenous causes" of concern); see also id. at 1201 ("[T]he
Civil Code provides for the general law, a referent, which must include unifying principles.");
Amaro, supra note 22 (throughout, using the phrase, "droit commun" to refer to the Civil
Code as a source of general principles common to all private law); EVA STEINER, FRENCH
LEGAL METHOD 15 (2002) (many Civil Code provisions state general principles rather than
detailed rules).
47 The 1804 Napoleonic Code provided that an agreement between parties created a private
law between them: "Les conventions Idgalementformies tiennent lieu de loi & ceux qui les ont
faites." C. civ. art. 1134 (Fr. 2015). As translated by Professor Crabb, the full text of Article
1134 reads: "Agreements legally made take the place of law for those who make them. They
may be revoked only by mutual consent or for causes which the law authorizes. They must be
executed in good faith." Crabb trans., supra note 19, art. 1134. Article 1103 of the reformed
Civil Code maintains this concept: "Contracts which are lawfully formed have the binding
force of legislation for those who have made them." REFORM IN ENGLISH, supra note 15, at 2,
art. 1104. The reform also explicitly mentions freedom to contract, although in a larger
context that suggests limits to this value: "Everyone is free to contract or not to contract, to
choose the person with whom to contract, and to determine the content and form of the
contract, within the limits imposed by legislation. Contractual freedom does not allow
derogation from rules which are an expression of public policy." Id. at 2, art. 1102.
48 Article 5 of the 1804 Napoleonic Code restricted the scope of judicial decisions,
prohibiting judges from announcing general principles that would apply to a broader category
of cases than the dispute before the court: "Il est defendu auxjuges de prononcer par voie de
disposition gdndrale et rigle mentaire sur les causes qui leur sont soumises." C. Civ. art. 5
(Fr. 2015). Professor Crabb translates article 5 to read: "Judges are forbidden to pronounce
decisions by way of general and regulative disposition on causes which are submitted to
them." Crabb trans., supra note 19, art. 5; see Calleros, supra note 30, at 94-97 (discussing
reasons for limits on judicial authority, and the limited judicial lawmaking that takes place);
Ad6laide Remiche, When Judging Is Power: A Gender Perspective on the French and
American Judiciaries, 3 J.L. & COURTS 95, 100-01 (2015) (explaining how the French
judiciary is not an equal power in the French conception of separation of powers).
49 One law firm sounded this alarm: "the fact that the notion of 'significant imbalance' is
not clearly defined is frightening: the judicial appraisal thus defines its own scope of
intervention." EBA, supra note 16, at 1. But see Amaro, supra note 22, at 5, § 2 (reception of
the assessment of significant imbalance into the Civil Code seems natural).
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Similar tensions between the values of freedom of contract and protection
against abusive terms have fed a long-running debate in the United States
over the merits of the unconscionability doctrine. A comparison of U.S. law
with that of the French reform, however, suggests that article 1171 of the
reform should give little cause for concern, particularly in the reform's
context within a European market governed by EU directives and despite the
French tradition of limiting the power of the judiciary.
II. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE U.S. EXPERIENCE WITH
UNCONSCIONABILITY
Historically, courts in the common law system have withheld the
equitable remedy of specific performance in actions to enforce
unconscionably unfair exchanges, leaving the plaintiff to his legal remedy of
money damages, however inadequate the legal remedy might be.o But, the
modern doctrine of unconscionability goes further, empowering judges to
strike down a contract or a particular contract term, thus extinguishing an
obligation and any means to enforce it."
A. Unconscionability under the Unform Commercial Code
Although courts in the United States sowed the seeds of a general
doctrine of unconscionability prior to the twentieth century,52 the doctrine
so See, e.g., E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS §§ 4.27, 12.4, 12.7, at 294-97, 729-43,
751-57 (4th ed. 2004); JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS § 16.7, at
560 (6th ed. 2009) (historically, specific performance was left to the "conscience" of the
chancellor); id. § 16.14, at 565 (specific performance can be denied on grounds of
unconscionability, which "constitutes the foundation stone of much of equitable doctrine").
For two oft cited twentieth century examples, see McKinnon v. Benedict, 38 Wis. 2d 607, 157
N.W.2d 665 (1968) and Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 172 F.2d 80 (3d Cir. 1948). In Wentz,
the court denied specific performance of a lopsided contract against a deliberately breaching
grower, even though the remedy at law for money damages was inadequate, because "equity
does not enforce unconscionable bargains." Id. at 83. The court stated that the proposition
just quoted was "too well established to require elaborate citation," id., but it nonetheless cited
to "4 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1405a (5th ed. 1941); 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS
§ 1425 (Rev. ed. 1937)," id. at 83 n.12.
51 See, e.g., Maxwell v. Fid. Fin. Servs., Inc., 184 Ariz. 82, 907 P.2d 51 (1995) (remanding
for consideration whether facts relating to commercial context would support finding of
unconscionability and cancellation of remainder of financed debt); Jones v. Star Credit Co.,
298 N.Y.S.2d 264 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1969) (reforming contract to eliminate further amounts
owed); cf Hazel Glenn Beh, Curing the Infirmities of the Unconscionability Doctrine, 66
HASTINGS L.J. 1011, 1022-25 (2015), http://ssm.com/abstract-2664778 (split in opinion about
whether court can order restitution after striking down unconscionable contract).
52 See, e.g., Hila Keren, Guilt-Free Markets? Unconscionability, Conscience, And
Emotions, 2016 BYU L. REv. 427, 438-40; Larry A. DiMatteo & Bruce Louis Rich, A
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received a great boost half a century ago from Section 2-302 of the Uniform
Commercial Code: 3
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any
clause of the contract to have been unconscionable at the time
it was made the court may refuse to enforce the contract, or it
may enforce the remainder of the contract without the
unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any
unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.
(2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract
or any clause thereof may be unconscionable the parties shall
be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present evidence as to
its commercial setting, purpose and effect to aid the court in
making the determination.54
On its face, this code provision makes substantial inroads into "ancient
concepts of freedom of contract,",5 which respect the contracting parties'
exercise of autonomy in freely shaping their contractual rights and
obligations as "private legislators."5 6 When courts enforce the parties'
contract as agreed, obeying the maxim that courts must not rewrite the
Consent Theory of Unconscionability: An Empirical Study ofLaw in Action, 33 FLA. ST. U. L.
REv. 1067, 1071 (2006). A recent ruling refers to unconscionability analysis as an inherent
judicial power. State of New Mexico ex rel. King v. B&B Inv. Grp., Inc., 329 P.3d 658, 670
(N.M. 2014) ("Ruling on substantive unconscionability is an inherent equitable power of the
court, and does not require prior legislative action.").
s3 Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability,
70 U. CHI. L. REv. 1203, 1256 (2003) (stating that "the equitable doctrine of unconscionability
[was] revitalized by its enactment" in the UCC); James F. Hogg, Consumer Beware: The Varied
Application of Unconscionability Doctrine to Exculpation and Indemnfication Clauses In
Michigan, Minnesota, and Washington, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REv. 1011, 1013-15 (showing the
influence of the intervening UCC on the common law in the progression from the First
Restatement on contracts to the Second Restatement); Anne Fleming, The Rise and Fall of
Unconscionability as the Law of the Poor, 102 GEO. L.J. 1383, 1405 (2014) (only a handful of
jurisdictions had applied modem unconscionability doctrine prior to widespread adoption of the
UCC).
' U.C.C. § 2-302 (2011).
5 M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 11 (1972).
56 PETER NYGH, AUTONoMY IN INTERNATIONAL CoNTRAcTs 2 (1999); see also supra note
48 (discussing the French Civil Code's declaration that the parties' agreement takes the place
of law between them); Emily L. Sherwin, Law and Equity in Contract Enforcement, 50 MD. L.
REv. 253, 271 (1991) ("[A]t least the more traditional views of contractual autonomy hold that
judicial relief against bad judgment or lack of sophistication denies the promisor the respect
and equality required by liberal philosophy.").
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contract for the parties,57 they increase certainty and predictability, thus
encouraging parties to rely on their bargains.58  In contrast, Section 2-302
could reduce the certainty and predictability of enforcement because it fails
to define unconscionability; it thus advances a vague and flexible standard
that allows judges to exercise an exceptional degree of discretion in
excluding contract terms.59 Moreover, its reference to "limit[ing] the
application of any unconscionable clause" arguably grants judges the option
of rewriting an objectionable clause rather than simply refusing to enforce it
in total.60
In sum, "Section 2-302's broad mandate to strike or modify any
unconscionable clause or contract makes it potentially the most freedom-
limiting device available to courts."61 Moreover, most courts recognize a
similar unconscionability doctrine under common law for non-sales
transactions.62
5 See, e.g., Jaeger v. Can. Bank of Commerce, 327 F.2d 743, 745 (9th Cir. 1964) (quoting
City of New Orleans v. New Orleans Water Works Co., 142 U.S. 79, 91 (1891) for the
proposition that "[clourts have no power to make new contracts or to impose new terms on
them without their consent"); Valley Med. Specialists v. Farber, 982 P.2d 1277, 1286 (1999)
(en banc) (in action to enforce noncompetition agreement, stating, "The court of appeals, in
essence, rewrote the agreement in an attempt to make it enforceable. This goes too far.").
58 NYGH, supra note 56.
59 See, e.g., Fleming, supra note 53, at 1422 (summarizing Arthur Leff's "devastating
critique" of the vagueness of the unconscionability doctrine); John E. Murray, The Judicial
Vision Of Contract: The Constructed Circle Of Assent And Unconscionability, 52 DuQ. L.
REv. 263, 263-65 (2014) (voicing scathing criticism of continuing lack of definition in
Section 2-302 after years of judicial application); Sherwin, supra note 56, at 257-58 & n.23
(noting the indeterminacy of the fairness requirement for specific performance and remarking
on the similarity of unconscionability analysis); DAVID SLAWSON, BINDING PROMISES: THE
LATE 20TH-CENTURY REFORMATION OF CONTRACT LAW 57 (1996) (case law is fact specific
and has not resulted in a clear definition of unconscionability).
60 Cf Ralph H. King, Suggested Changes in the Uniform Commercial Code-Sales, 33 OR.
L. REv. 113, 115 (1954) (even completely striking out a clause and enforcing the rest "is in
conflict with the maxim that courts will not make contracts for the parties").
61 DiMatteo & Rich, supra note 52, at 1071.
62 See, e.g., Mandel v. Liebman, 303 N.Y. 88, 93-94, 100 N.E.2d 149, 152 (1951) (although
finding no unconcionability, applying an unconscionability standard to a service contract);
Korobkin, supra note 53; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1981)
(summarizing a common law principle of unconscionability); CAL. Civ. CODE § 1670.5 (2011)
(legislatively recognizing unconscionability doctrine in any kind of contract); Williams v.
Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 448-49 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (viewing Section 2-302
as persuasive authority and applying a common-law doctrine of unconscionability to
transactions executed prior to effective date of jurisdiction's UCC); supra note 54 (sources
discussing references to unconscionability prior to Section 2-302, or apart from it).
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On the other hand, modem legal systems do not honor individual
autonomy and freedom of contract to the exclusion of other values.63
Respect for the parties' bargain is necessarily compromised to uphold public
policies and to achieve justice in individual cases:
It is, of course, far too late in the day to seriously suggest that
the law has not made substantial inroads into such freedom of
private contracts. There exists an unavoidable tension between
the concept of freedom to contract, which has long been basic
to our socioeconomic system, and the equally fundamental
belief that an enlightened society must to some extent protect
its members from the potentially harsh effects of an unchecked
free market system . . .. [T]he law has developed the concept
of unconscionability so as to prevent the unjust enforcement of
onerous contractual terms which one party is able to
impose ... because of a significant disparity in bargaining
power.
Prior to the advent of Section 2-302, many courts sought to achieve this
balance through aggressive use of traditional tools, such as through strained
interpretation of contract terms.65 In contrast, the unconscionability doctrine
provides courts in the United States with a more straightforward, less covert
means of policing abusive contracting, 66 just as article 1171 of the French
reform provides the French judiciary with a more straightforward policing
doctrine than the amorphous concept of cause.6 ' Further, some scholars have
argued that the compromise to individual autonomy and free markets is
63 See Aditi Bagchi, Contract as Procedural Justice, 7 JuRIs. 47, 65 (2016) ("Autonomy is
not all that is at issue in contract.... [D]istributive justice and background involuntary duties
between individual duties shape the normative landscape of contract."); Jay Lawrence
Westbrook, Commercial Law and the Public Interest, 4 PENN. ST. J.L. & INT'L AFF. 445
(2015), http://elibrary.law.psu.edu/jlia/vol4/issl/19 (describing the lack of consideration of
public policy in commercial litigation and encouraging courts to identify public interest
factors); Beh, supra note 51, at 1044 (unconscionable contracts "have negative impacts
beyond the parties," by "undermin[ing] basic principles of contract law and threaten[ing]
social order").
6 Rowe v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 385 N.E.2d 566, 569 (N.Y. 1978) (quoted in
DiMatteo & Rich, supra note 52); see also H.C.C., Jr., Note, Unconscionable Sales Contracts
and the Uniform Commercial Code, Section 2-302, 45 VA. L. REv. 583, 592 (1959)
("Absolute freedom of contract is no more than a nineteenth century ideal; one which has
never existed in our law.").
65 Murray, supra note 59, at 267-69; Fleming, supra note 53, at 1402; U.C.C. § 2-302, cmt.
1 2011).
6 Fleming, supra note 53, at 1405.
67 See supra notes 19-24.
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modest. A party's autonomy includes justified freedom from contract when
real consent to standard terms is doubtful.8 Judicial intervention in
appropriate cases can increase confidence and participation in free markets
by motivating traders to avoid insisting on abusive terms in standard-form
contracts.69
Fortunately, the concept of unconscionability did not remain completely
undefined. The official comment to Section 2-302 provides a starting point
by referring to "one-sided" clauses resulting in "oppression and unfair
surprise." 7 0 In the celebrated case of Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture
Co.,71 an early decision applying the equivalent of Section 2-302,72 Judge
Skelly Wright added further definition by focusing on "an absence of
meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties together with contract
terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other party." 73 This definition
fits nicely with the dual categories of procedural and substantive
unconscionability, which Arthur Leff introduced in his critical review of
Section 2-302 appearing two years after the Williams case.7 4 Most courts
require the establishment of both branches to support a claim of
68 Korobkin, supra note 53, at 1205 (discussing argument that enforcement of standard-
form terms undermines the individual autonomy of the non-drafting party, who is bound by
terms which he or she had no opportunity to negotiate); Fleming, supra note 53, at 1400
(summarizing Kessler's argument that enforcement of standard-form, adhesion contracts
concentrated economic power in a way that threatened freedom); Bagchi, supra note 63, at 24
(discussing autonomy interests in the freedom to change one's mind and revise commitments
to match present goals and needs).
69 Westbrook, supra note 63, at 448; see also Keren, supra note 52, at 109 (promoting
"judicial decisions condemning exploitative bargaining practices . . . to galvanize self-restraint
by participating in the social cueing of conscience"); Beh, supra note 51, at 1042 (asserting
that courts "can exercise their discretion to promote conscionable contracting in the
marketplace."). But cf id. at 1022 (because so few disputes are litigated, the
unconscionability doctrine will be effective only if it deters abusive clauses from the outset);
id. at 1013 ("[T]he hammer of unconscionability rarely changes bargaining behaviors,
particularly among institutional repeat players.").
70 U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1 (2011).
" 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
72 In Williams, the court applied the common law equivalent of Section 2-302 because the
UCC had been adopted but was not yet effective in the District of Columbia at the time of the
transaction. Id. at 448-49.
7 Id. at 449.
74 Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U.
PA. L. REV. 485, 533-40 (1967).
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unconscionability,5 but many allow a strong showing on one branch to
compensate for minimal unconscionability on the other branch.
Judge Wright explained that absence of meaningful choice (procedural
unconscionability) implicated factors such as inequality of bargaining power,
level of education of the parties, and a reasonable opportunity to find and
understand the terms. Over the next decade, courts analyzing procedural
unconscionability found relevance in these and other factors:
age, education, intelligence, business acumen and experience,
relative bargaining power, who drafted the contract, whether
the terms were explained to the weaker party, whether
alterations in the printed terms were possible, whether there
were alternative sources of supply for the goods in question.
Perhaps the most important procedural issue is whether the terms of the
contract were subject to negotiation and alteration, or whether one party had
sufficient bargaining power to impose its terms in an adhesion contract,
presenting non-negotiable terms to which the other party must "adhere."
Although the unconscionability doctrine is not limited to adhesion
contracts,80 most cases involve adhesion contracts,'8 1 and some courts find
that a requisite degree of procedural unconscionability is established by that
factor alone.82
7 Stirlen v. Supercuts, 51 Cal. App. 4th 1519, 1533, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 138, 145 (1997).
76 E.g., Tillman v. Commercial Credit Loans, Inc., 362 N.C. 93, 102-03, 655 S.E.2d 362,
370 (2008); James Maxeiner, Standard Terms Contracting in the Global Electronic Age:
European Alternatives, 28 YALE J. INT'L L. 109, 119 (2003) (referring to sliding scale test).
" Williams, 350 F.2d at 449.
78 Johnson v. Mobil Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp. 264, 268 (E.D. Mich. 1976).
7 Edwin Patterson provided this early definition of contracts: "Life-insurance contracts are
contracts of 'adhesion.' The contract is drawn up by the insurer and the insured, who merely
'adheres' to it, has little choice as to its terms." Edwin W. Patterson, The Delivery of a Life-
Insurance Policy, 33 HARV. L. REV. 198, 222 (1919) (footnote notation omitted) (citing in part
to Rend Demogue, in MODERN FRENCH LEGAL PHILOSoPHY, 472, 477; 2 M. PLANIOL, TRAITt
ELtMEXTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL, § 972); see also infra note 159 (use and translation of this term
in the French Civil Code).80 E.g., Fleming, supra note 53, at 1421.
81 Murray, supra note 59, at 266; Maxeiner, supra note 76, at 117-18.
82 See, e.g., Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 279 F.3d 889, 893 (9th Cir. 2002) (applying
California law); see also Korobkin, supra note 53, at 1258 n.201 (reviewing cases and
concluding that most courts do not find procedural unconscionability on the basis of adhesion
contract alone).
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Disparate bargaining power alone does not establish procedural
unconscionability, 3 but it often enables parties with superior bargaining
strength to impose contracts of adhesion, which "bear within them the clear
danger of oppression and overreaching."84 Disparate bargaining power and
consequent adhesion contracts are a frequent feature of consumer contracts;85
however, even an experienced businessperson can fall victim to
unconscionable terms imposed by a business entity with greater bargaining
power.86
In Williams, Judge Wright stated that a finding of procedural
unconscionability justifies abandoning the traditional rule that a party is
strictly bound by a contract that he has signed-even though he may not
have read or understood it8 7-and it consequently triggers an analysis of
"reasonableness or fairness."88  For this substantive branch of
unconscionability, Judge Wright quoted with approval Corbin's standard:
"whether the terms are 'so extreme as to appear unconscionable according to
the mores and business practices of the time and place.' "9 Admittedly, this
circular definition adds little more than a general factual context for
assessing the unfairness of a clause or contract. Again, repeated judicial
applications over the years helped courts to develop more concrete guidance:
Substantive unconscionability concerns the actual terms of the
contract and examines the relative fairness of the obligations
assumed.... Indicative of substantive unconscionability are
8 E.g., Seekings v. Jimmy GMC of Tucson, Inc., 130 Ariz. 596, 602, 638 P.2d 210, 216
(1981) (no unconscionability because seller did not use its "superior bargaining position to
opgress or unfairly surprise" the buyers).
Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc., 28 Cal. 3d 807, 818, 623 P.2d 165, 171 (1981); see also
Rowe v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 385 N.E.2d 566, 569 (N.Y. 1978) (referring to "onerous
contractual terms which one party is able to impose ... because of a significant disparity in
bargaining power"); see also Murray, supra note 59, at 271 ("There is no question that parties,
particularly consumers, do not read the boilerplate that invariably attaches to standardized
transactions.").
85 See generally AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1750 (2011) ("[T]he
times in which consumer contracts were anything other than adhesive are long past.").
86 E.g., Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc., 28 Cal. 3d 807, 623 P.2d 165 (1981) (experienced
rock music promoter Bill Graham had no choice but to hire musical acts through union's
adhesion contract, with unconscionable term); Nagrampa v. Mailcoups, Inc., 469 F.3d 1257
(9th Cir. 2006) (parent company with greater bargaining power imposed unconscionable
arbitration clause on individual franchise holder).
87 See Murray, supra note 59, at 270 (referring to the "sacred rubric of contract law that one
is bound by the terms to which he apparently agreed, regardless of whether he read or
understood such terms").
8 Williams, 350 F.2d at 449-50.
89 Id. at 450 (citing to 1 CoRBIN, CoNTRAcTs § 128 (1963)).
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contract terms so one-sided as to oppress or unfairly surprise an
innocent party, an overall imbalance in the obligations and
rights imposed by the bargain, and significant cost-price
disparity.
The final factor quoted above is significant because it appears to undermine
the traditional rule that courts will not assess the equality or fairness of an
exchange under the consideration doctrine. 9' This tension with consideration
analysis is especially great if a court permits a finding of unconscionability
on the basis of substantive unconscionability alone and then finds substantive
unconscionability on the basis of an inflated price or other imbalance in the
main obligations of the contract.92
Because Judge Wright remanded for findings under the standard he
announced in Williams, he did not apply his standard to the facts and
announced no decision on a buyer's challenge to a draconian repossession
clause.93 In stating the procedural history, however, Judge Wright quoted
two paragraphs from the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, which
strongly condemned a vendor for selling a stereo set and other household
goods to a recipient of government support "with full knowledge that [she]
had to feed, clothe and support both herself and seven children" on a
monthly government stipend of less than half of the cost of the stereo set.9 4
Against that backdrop, dissenting Judge Danaher warned of misplaced
paternalism undermining a source of credit for clients on government relief,
erosion of freedom of contract, and uncertainty about the enforceability of
"thousands upon thousands of installment credit transactions in this
jurisdiction." 95
90 Maxwell v. Fid. Fin. Services, Inc., 907 P.2d 51, 59 (1995) (in banc) (citing to Res.
Mgmt. Co. v. Weston Ranch & Livestock Co., 706 P.2d 1028, 1041 (Utah 1985), but with
some citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
91 See, e.g., Batsakis v. Demotsis, 226 S.W.2d 673 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1949) (declining to
upset bargain requiring repayment of $2,000 plus interest in exchange for loan of Greek
currency allegedly worth $25 at the time of the loan); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 79(b) (1981) (rejecting any requirement of "equivalence in the values exchanged" if other
elements of consideration are met).
92 See, e.g., Maxwell, 907 P.2d 51, 59-60 (permitting trial court to find unconscionability
on basis of substantive factors alone, and stating "[t]hese facts present at least a question of
grossly-excessive price, constituting substantive unconscionability"); see also id. at 93, 907
P.2d at 62 (Martone, J., concurring in judgment) (opining that court could find
unconscionability as a matter of law without further findings on remand).
93 Williams, 350 F.2d at 450.
94 Id. at 45a 
i95 Id. at 450-51 (Danaher, J., dissenting).
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B. Retrenchment in Judicial Intervention
In the years following the Williams decision, many courts appeared to
heed the concerns expressed by Judge Danaher. In resolving the tension
between freedom of contract and judicial intervention to achieve fairness,
courts generally respected the parties' bargain 96 absent exceptional
unfairness that satisfied an increasingly demanding test of shocking the
court's conscience.97 This judicial conservatism coincided with a return to
textualism and formalism in contract law, with the growth of the law and
economics movement, and with conservative political movements against
government regulation and judicial activism.98 By the 1980's, according to
E. Allan Farnsworth, unconscionability had suffered from "arrested
development." 99
The unconscionability doctrine later enjoyed resurgence as a means of
policing asymmetric or otherwise unfair mandatory arbitration clauses,1''
particularly in California, where judicial application of unconscionability
doctrine had remained fairly robust. 01 However, the Supreme Court blunted
96 See, e.g., DiMatteo & Rich, supra note 52, at 1071 & nn.14, 18; Tess Wilkinson-Ryan,
Intuitive Formalism in Contract, 163 U. PA. L. REv. 2109, 2114 (2015) ("Unexpected clauses
embedded in lengthy boilerplate are routinely upheld, unless there is a legislative response.").
9 See Keren, supra note 52, at 443; see also Maxeiner, supra note 76, at 121
(unconscionability "has proven to be a hard standard to meet").
98 See Cheryl B. Preston & Eli McCann, Llewellyn Slept Here: A Short History of Sticky
Contracts and Feudalism, 91 ORE. L. REv. 129, 161-67 (2012); Jeffrey W. Stempel,
Arbitration, Unconscionability, and Equilibrium: The Return of Unconscionability Analysis as
a Counterweight to Arbitration Formalism, 19 Omo ST. J. oN Disp. RESOL. 757, 821-24
(2004) (discussing all these factors); Fleming, supra note 53, at 1430-31 (reviewing
conservative political critique against judicial activism and law-and-economics arguments
against the competence of courts to make distributive decisions); Keren, supra note 52, at
119-20; see also Sherwin, supra note 56, at 269 ("Judicial inquiry into the adequacy of values
exchanged [in withholding specific performance] is inconsistent with economic theory
because it violates the principle that value is subjective and best left to the judgment of the
parties.").
9 E. Allan Farnsworth, Developments in Contract Law During the 1980's: The Top Ten, 41
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 203, 222 (1990).
100 See, e.g., Murray, supra note 59, at 271 (arbitration clauses overcame judicial hesitation
in applying unconscionability); Beh, supra note 51, at 1032-34; Nagrampa v. Mailcoups, Inc.,
469 F.3d 1257 (9th Cir. 2006) (arbitration at location of parent company's corporate
headquarters placed unfair burden on individual franchise holder of limited means who lived
on opposite coast).
101 See, e.g., Harry G. Prince, Unconscionability in California: A Need for Restraint and
Consistency, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 459 (1995) (critiquing robust application of unconscionability
in California); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 279 F.3d 889, 893-94 (9th Cir. 2002)
(applying Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Svcs., Inc., 24 Cal. 4th 83, 6 P.3d 669
(2000) to strike down asymmetric arbitration clause that required only the employee to
arbitrate his claims and imposed other limits and burdens on employee).
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the resurgence in the arbitration context by holding that the Federal
Arbitration Act precluded the application of state unconscionability doctrine
to strike down class action waivers in mandatory arbitration clauses,1 02 thus
insulating firms from large numbers of claims too small to justify the costs of
individual arbitration.103
C. Alternatives to Unconscionability
1. Reasonable Expectations
As a supplement to unconscionability, some commentators have argued
for application of a reasonable expectations doctrine'04 to exclude oppressive
terms in lengthy standard-form contracts that the non-drafting party cannot
be expected to read in light of the bargaining context. 0 5 Under this doctrine,
a party who manifests assent to a form in such a context is held to all terms
102 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011); see also Am. Express Co. v.
Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2016) (Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) blocks challenge
to class action waiver even though cost of proving anti-trust allegations makes individual
claim economically unviable). AT&T does not preclude application of unconscionability
doctrine to asymmetry or other unfairness aside from class action waivers. See, e.g.,
Samaniego v. Empire Today LLC, 205 Cal. App. 4th 1138, 1150 (2012) (arbitration clause in
an employment agreement was unenforceable under the state's general unconscionability test,
because the arbitration clause was buried deeply in an adhesion contract and was substantively
lopsided in favor of the employer).
I3 See, e.g., J. Maria Glover, Disappearing Claims and the Erosion ofSubstantive Law, 124
YALE L.J. 3052 (2015). One commentator opines that the Supreme Court's recent arbitration
jurisprudence reflects a second era of privileging freedom of contract over equity, comparable
to the Lochner era, during which freedom of contract had a constitutional status. Hila Keren,
Undermining Justice: The Two Rises ofFreedom of Contract and the Fall ofEquity, 2 CAN. J.
COMP. & CONTEMP. L. 339 (2016).
1 Murray, supra note 59, at 273 ("The solution to the printed clause dilemma that would
encompass most of the unconscionability cases is a general recognition of the reasonable
expectations concept."); Maxeiner, supra note 76, at 120 (distinguishing the reasonable
expectations doctrine from section 211 of the second Restatement); Eric A. Zacks, The
Restatement (Second) Of Contracts § 211: Unfulfilled Expectations And The Future Of
Modern Standardized Consumer Contracts, 734 WM. & MARY Bus. L. REv. 733, 757
(praising RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 (1981), which is similar to the
reasonable expectations doctrine, as a reasonable compromise between competing values);
Charles R. Calleros, The Reasonable Expectations of Consumers, CONTRACTSPROF BLOG
(May 28, 2013), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/contractsprof blog/2013/05/boilerplate-
symposium-part-xiii-charles-calleros.html (invited essay for online symposium on
BOILERPLATE by Margaret Jane Radin).
105 See, e.g., Robert E. Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy Provisions, 83
HARv. L. REv. 961, 966-78 (1970); Hogg, supra note 53, at 118 (citing KARL N. LLEWELLYN,
THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 371 (1960) (summarizing the views of
Llewellyn)); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 (1981).
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that lie within a reasonable range for such contracts but would not be bound
by bizarre or oppressive terms that lie outside the bounds of reasonable
expectations. Even a highly surprising term could be brought within the
range of reasonable expectations if the drafting party gave specific notice of
the provision to the non-drafting party, such as pointing out and explaining
the term and requiring specific assent through initials next to a term or
through a separate click on a website.1 06  The reasonable expectations
doctrine for standard-form contracts, however, has gained much less traction
in the courts than unconscionability. 107
2. Specific Legislative and Administrative Regulation
In light of limitations on judicial intervention, judges and commentators
have frequently argued for specific legislative and administrative regulation
of abusive contract terms, much like the approach taken in the French
Consumer Code and the EU Directive on Unfair Contract Terms. 0 8 In the
Williams case, for example, Judge Danaher supported the view of the court
below that the legislature should specifically address the problems reflected
10 See Korobkin, supra note 53, at 1246-47 (positing this approach but noting the problem
of consumer's bounded rationality concerning some contract terms, even when the terms are
brought to a consumer's attention); see also Maxeiner, supra note 76, at 125 (explaining that
an early draft of the abandoned revision of UCC article 2 proposed a rule that would have
encouraged this practice). Of course, lawmakers could categorically prohibit certain kinds of
terms so that even specific notice and assent would not support enforcement. See, e.g., infra
note 111 (executive order, regulatory proposal, and legislative bills that have or, if adopted,
would bar pre-dispute arbitration agreements in some contexts or for some purposes).
107 Zacks, supra note 104, at 757-60 (noting the low level of acceptance of section 211 of
the second Restatement, except in Arizona, where courts have frequently focused on the
reasonable expectations of the consumer, in contrast to the focus of section 211 on the belief
of the vendor about the consumer's lack of knowledge); Korobkin, supra note 53, at 1271 &
n.264 (noting that reasonable expectations doctrine apparently has been "almost completely
forgotten by courts, at least outside the realm of insurance contracts" and other than in the
state of Arizona); Preston & McCann, supra note 98, at 160-61 (observing that reasonable
expectations doctrine fared worse than unconscionability, but Tennessee courts developed a
"circle of assent" doctrine that borrowed elements from reasonable expectations).
108 See supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text (explaining the approach taken in the
French Consumer Code, in implementation of an EU Directive); Aaron E. Ghirardelli, Rules
of Engagement in the Conflict Between Businesses and Consumers in Online Contracts, 93
OR. L. REv. 719, 756-69 (2015) (reviewing and recommending European approaches,
including administrative lists of presumptively abusive and forbidden contract terms); Keren,
supra note 52, at 497 (noting that norms against commercial exploitation are "[i]deally"
announced by legislatures, as in other Western legal systems, but unconscionability doctrine
can "send a clear and general message" in the meantime).
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by "exploitive contracts as were utilized in the case."'o9 Since that 1965
decision, several commentators have voiced support for more robust and
specific legislative and administrative regulation of abusive contract terms
and bargaining tactics, either as a form of regulation that is superior to
judicial scrutiny for unconscionability or as a welcome element of a
comprehensive legal framework." 0
In recent years, this call has been heeded to a limited extent in the
regulation of mandatory arbitration clauses. In 2014, for example, President
Obama issued an executive order on "Fair Pay and Safe Workplaces,"
forbidding major federal contractors from requiring employees to agree,
prior to a dispute, to mandatory arbitration of claims of sexual assault or
harassment."' Earlier, in the aftermath of the financial crash of 2008,
Congress passed the 2010 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act,1 2 which prohibited mandatory arbitration agreements in
certain contexts in the financial industry," 3 and established the Bureau of
10 Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 450 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (Danaher,
J., dissenting) (quoting Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 198 A.2d 914, 916 (D.C.
Ct. App. 1964)).
110 E.g., Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Crowd-Consumers and the Common
Law Tradition, 31 U. PITm. L. REv. 349, 352 n.18, 352-58 (1970) (recommending legislative
regulation of standard-form contracts as a type of product and noting deficiencies of case-by-
case judicial regulation without legislative or administrative guidance); Oren Bar-Gill &
Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 84-100 (2008) (arguing that a
motivated regulatory agency with sufficient authority can be more nimble and innovative than
a legislature); Peter Linzer, Contract as Evil, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 971, 985 (2015) ("There is
plenty of agency power, federal and state, that can be used against adhesion contracts and the
like, and we should actively seek its use."); Fleming, supra note 53, at 1429-30 (explaining
that legislation in the aftermath of the Williams case provided more effective relief from
abusive financial terms in the D.C. jurisdiction than judicial application of unconscionability);
JONATHAN C. LIPSON, STEWART MACAULAY, WILLIAM C. WHITFORD & KATHRYN HENDLEY,
CONTRACTS: LAW IN ACTION 200 (4th ed. 2016) (summarizing Jean Braucher's view that
specific rules adopted through legislation and especially through administrative regulation can
change commercial behavior at the outset, without the need for litigation); Zacks, supra note
104, at 793 (discussing benefits of administrative regulation, "particularly where clearly
identifiable problems have emerged"); see also State ex rel. King v. B&B Inv. Grp., Inc., 329
P.3d 658 (N.M. 2014) (finding and providing remedies for an unconscionable trade practice
under the state's Unfair Practices Act, which authorized suit by the state on behalf of a
consumer). But see Todd Zywicki, The Dodd-Frank Act Five Years Later: Are We More
Stable?, 43 J. FIN. TRANSFORMATION 62 (2016) (critiquing Dodd-Frank legislation and the
Bureau as arbitrary and counter-productive regulation).
11 Exec. Order No. 13,673 § 6; 79 Fed. Reg. 45,309, 45,314 (July 31, 2014).
112 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124
Stat. 1376 (2010).
113 Id. § 1414(e) (codified as 15 U.S.C. 1639c(e)) (prohibiting arbitration agreements in
connection with mortgage loans); id. § 922(b) (codified as 18 U.S.C. 1514A(e)) (prohibiting
arbitration agreements in connection with certain types of whistleblower proceedings); see
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Consumer Financial Protection. 114 The Act empowered the Bureau to (1)
study and report findings to Congress about pre-dispute arbitration
agreements in connection with consumer financial products or services"'
and (2) issue regulations prohibiting or limiting such agreements, consistent
with the Bureau's study, if such regulation is in the public interest and for the
protection of consumers. 116 In 2016, after publishing a notice of proposed
rulemaking and requesting comment,' 17 the Bureau issued regulations that
require providers of financial products or services to (1) submit specified
arbitral records to the Bureau for any pre-dispute arbitration agreement that it
includes in a consumer contract, (2) refrain from seeking to rely on a pre-
dispute arbitration agreement in connection with a class action related to
consumer financial products or services, and (3) provide plain-language
notice in pre-dispute arbitration agreements of the inapplicability of the
arbitration agreement to class actions claims." 8 While this proposed rule of
the Bureau was pending, two other federal agencies issued final rules
regulating pre-dispute arbitration clauses in certain kinds of contracts.' 19 But
also id. §§ 921(a), 921(b) (codified as 15 U.S.C. 78o(o), 80b-5(f)) (authorizing the SEC to
regulate arbitration agreements in transactions between consumers and securities broker-
dealers or investment advisors).
114 Id. § 1011 (codified as 12 U.S.C. § 5491).
11. Id. § 1028(a) (codified as 12 U.S.C. § 5518(a)).
116 Id. § 1028(b) (codified as 12 U.S.C. § 5518(b)).
117 Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 12 CFR Part
1040, RIN 3170-AA51, http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/CFPBArbitration Agr
eementsNotice of ProposedRulemaking.pdf. The Bureau received thousands of comments.
C. Ryan Barber, CFPB Flooded With Thousands of Comments Over Arbitration Rule, NAT'L
L.J. (Aug. 22, 2016), http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202765673354/CFPB-Flooded-
With-Thousands-of-Comments-Over-Arbitration-Rule?cmp.
11s Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 117, at 201. As this article was going to
print, the Bureau issued a final rule in July 2017, making the arbitration regulations effective
September 18, 2017, unless overturned by Congress. Bureau of Consumer Financial
Protection, Arbitration Agreements, 12 CFR Part 1040, 82 Fed. Reg. 33210 (July 19, 2017).
119 The Department of Health and Human Services issued a final rule prohibiting pre-dispute
arbitration clauses in nursing home contracts. 81 FR 68688, RIN 0938-AR61, § 483.70(n), at
68867 (Oct. 4, 2016), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2016-10-04/pdfl2016-23503.pdf.
Similarly, the Department of Education has issued a final rule amending the Federal Direct
Loan Program to prohibit participating schools from invoking pre-dispute arbitration
agreements or class action waivers, and requiring them to provide certain notices and
disclosures regarding arbitration. 34 FR 75926, RIN 1840-ADI9, § 685.300(e)-(g) (Nov. 1,
2016), https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eAgendaViewRule?publd=201610&RIN=1840-A
D19. One can anticipate litigation raising the issue whether such regulations are inconsistent
with the FAA or are supported by legislation that supersedes the FAA. See, e.g., Dep't Educ.,
Borrower Defense Regulations: November 2016, Unofficial Final Regulations, pp. 550-67;
see also id. at 563 n.80 (listing examples of federal statutes that authorize regulation of
arbitration in certain contracts). More broadly, congressional bills introduced in 2015 would
bar enforcement of pre-dispute arbitration agreements as applied to employment, consumer,
2812017]1
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elections have consequences, leaving these regulatory efforts subject to
reversal or rollback by the Trump administration and Congress.
In sum, the U.C.C. brought the unconscionability doctrine into the
mainstream of contract law across the United States,1 20 but controversy over its
vague standards led to judicial restraint in its application in most courts.1 2 1
Hazel Glenn Beh argues for a judicial "attitudinal adjustment" to the extent of
"embrac[ing] unconscionability's flexibility as a necessary counterweight to
mindless formalism and rigidity" and "recogniz[ing] that unconscionability
shares the objectives of illegality" and should trigger a similar guardian
function.1 22  To effectively regulate abusive contract terms and contracting
tactics while avoiding controversy over the appropriate role of the judiciary,
Russell Korobkin argues for a "combination of market, legislative, and judicial
action designed to capitalize on the advantages and minimize the
disadvantages of all three institutions." 23 To the extent that market forces
such as consumer choicel 2 4 and reputational effects 25 do not discourage
abusive practices, and to an extent consistent with political realities, policing
functions can be shared by legislatures, administrative agencies, and the
judiciary, in ways that capitalize on their respective strengths.1 2 6
antitrust, and civil rights disputes. Arbitration Fairness Act of 2015, S. 1133, 114th Cong. § 3
(2015); Arbitration Fairness Act of 2015, H.R. 2087, 114th Cong. § 3 (2015). However,
Congress has not moved them forward.
120 See supra note 53.
121 See supra notes 97-104.
122 Beh, supra note 51, at 1039-40.
123 Korobkin, supra note 53, at 1254; see also supra notes 108-10 and accompanying text.
124 Korobkin, supra note 53, at 1206, 1246-47 (consumers can motivate businesses to
compete in some markets, but only with respect to salient features, based on information that
consumers effectively process in light of their bounded rationality); FARNSWORTH, supra note
50, § 4.28, at 307 ("[R]arely can a party claim surprise as to price."). Amaro, supra note 22,
at 6, § 6 (French Consumer Code apparently reflects assumptions that consumers pay attention
to price and can elicit competition on price but require protection from abusive auxiliary
clauses, such as liability limitations and arbitration clauses, which escape their attention or
comprehension); Leff, supra note 110, at 350 (consumers often lack information and expertise
to critically compare standard form contracts and do not focus on terms relating to the deal
breaking down).
125 Korobkin, supra note 53, at 1240 n.135 (citing to discussions of reputational effects on
businesses); G. Marcus Cole, Rational Consumer Ignorance: When and Why Consumers
Should Agree to Form Contracts Without Even Reading Them, 11 J.L. ECON. & POL'Y 413,
439-40 (2015).
126 See, e.g., Korobkin, supra note 53, at 1249, 1294-95 (legislatures and regulatory
agencies are better able than courts to define mandatory terms for contracts, but courts are
experts at reviewing terms in the contract); Robert A. Hillman, Debunking Some Myths About
Unconscionability: A New Framework for UC. C. Section 2-302, 67 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 28
(1981) (arguing that a degree of judicial flexibility is warranted because "legislators cannot
successfully draft legislation to encompass unforeseen circumstances"); Murray, supra note
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III. HONORING AND CONTROLLING FREEDOM OF CONTRACT IN FRANCE
A. An Evolving Balance ofPrinciples and Values
The 1804 Napoleonic Code strongly reflected principles of freedom of
contract and respect for individual autonomy, with necessary qualifications:
"Agreements legally made take the place of law for those who make them.
They may be revoked only by mutual consent or for causes which the law
authorizes. They must be executed in good faith,"1 2 7
However, one provision of the 1804 Civil Code, article 1152, was
unqualified in its deference to party autonomy and freedom of contract. Its
original text and modem evolution shed light on the French ideals of
freedom of contract, respect for individual autonomy, and limits on judicial
authority, as well as recent trends compromising those ideals to protect
weaker parties.
For more than a century and a half, article 1152 addressed contractually
stipulated damages in a single sentence: "When an agreement provides that
he who fails to execute it shall pay a sum certain by way of damages, there
may not be awarded to the other party a greater or lesser sum." 128 Under this
unqualified command, French courts enforced contractual penalty clauses
without adjustment,129 even though the Code permitted no more than
59, at 273 ("[c]ourts pursue the parties' reasonable expectations in virtually every contract
case they decide" and thus can be trusted to apply a reasonable expectations doctrine).
127 Crabb trans., supra note 19, art. 1134. The Civil Code Reform includes similar
principles, although in expanded form:
Art. 1102. - Everyone is free to contract or not to contract, to choose the
person with whom to contract, and to determine the content and form of the
contract, within the limits imposed by legislation.
Contractual freedom does not allow derogation from rules which are an
expression of public policy.
Art 1103. - Contracts which are lawfully formed have the binding force of
legislation for those who have made them.
Art. 1104. - Contracts must be negotiated, formed and performed in good
faith.
C. civ. art. 1102-04 (Fr. rev. 2016).
128 C. CIv. art. 1152. In its original French, the 1804 text read: "Lorsque la convention porte
que celui qui manquera de l'ex&uter payera une certaine somme 6 titre de dommages-
intir~ts, il ne peut 6tre alloud a l'autre partie une somme plus forte, ni moindre." C. Civ. art.
1152, 1st sentence (Fr. 2015).
129 See, e.g., Cour de cassation,Premidre chamber civile [Cass.1 e civ.] [highest court of
ordinary jurisdiction, first civil law chamber], Nov. 21, 1967, Bull. civ. I, 1968, Arr8t No. 337,
Pourvoi No. 65-13.412, 253, 254 (Fr.).
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compensation, in the absence of contractually stipulated damages, on claims
for breach of contract or even in tort. 130
This exceptional treatment of penalty clauses partly reflects a distrust of
the judiciary after the French Revolution in reaction to the perceived
excesses of the pre-revolutionary high courts, the Parlements, which
sometimes exercised quasi-legislative powers.' 31 The Constituent Assembly
of 1790 banned judicial issuance of regulations,1 32 and the 1804 Civil Code
prohibited French courts from declaring legal principles unnecessary to
resolve the disputes before them.1 33 The judicial branch emerged as less than
coequal with the legislative and executive branches. 134
This backlash against the judiciary, combined with a high regard for
individual autonomy and liberty in the wake of the Revolution, helps to
explain the French approaches to punitive damages and penalty clauses,
which appear at first glance to point in different directions. Absent the
protections afforded by criminal proceedings, the Code precludes the courts
from wielding excessive power and intruding on individual autonomy
through an award of punitive damages for breach of contract. 135 If the parties
had agreed in their contract to impose a penalty, however, article 1152 of the
original Code essentially ordered courts to respect the parties' autonomy and
freedom to contract: "there may not be awarded to the other party a greater
or lesser sum."1 3 6 Thus, the rules are consistent in reflecting great respect for
individual freedom and limits on the exercise of judicial power.
Even the original Code's explicit reference to freedom of contract
required deference only to contracts "legally made . . . in good faith,"1 37
formed with a "cause [that is] lawful." 38 Thus, even the original Code
130 See Calleros, supra note 30, at nn.137-38 and accompanying text (presenting French text
and English translations for C. civ. art. 1382, 1147 (Fr. 2015)). By legislation adopted in
1972, a court can issue fines, in an order of astreinte, to compel a dilatory party to perform a
contractual obligation after a judicial finding of breach of contract, but astreinte resembles a
preemptive contempt sanction more than extra-compensatory damages for breach. Id. at 99.
131 See JoHN P. DAWSoN, THE ORACLES OF THE LAW 273-74, 306-14, 350-71 (Greenwood
Press 1978) (1968).
132 Id. at 375-76.
133 See supra note 48 (presenting the text and English translation of C. CIv. art. 5 (Fr. 2015)).
"4 Remiche, supra note 48; see also STEINER, supra note 46, at 29, 32 (noting that the 1790
law precluding the judiciary from exercising legislative power "forms the basis for the French
doctrine of separation of powers").
'35 JoHtN YuKIo GOTANDA, SUPPLEMENTAL DAMAGES IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 193
(1998) (discussing the approach in civil law jurisdictions generally).
136 See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
137 See supra note 127 and accompanying text (presenting the text and translation of C. cIv.
art. 1134 (Fr. 2015), as well as counterparts in the reformed Civil Code).
138 See supra note 20.
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provided opportunities for the judiciary to apply and shape statutory
limitations on individual autonomy and freedom of contract. 13 9
B. Consumer Protection Movement-Finding a Balance
Over the last half century, further inroads into freedom of contract have
been laid by French and EU legislation, designed to protect weaker parties in
contracts1 4 0 and necessarily reflecting or requiring a softening of the post-
revolutionary distrust of the judiciary in France. For example, in 1975,
coinciding with the rise in the consumer protection movement in Europe, 14 1
the French legislature amended article 1152 of the Civil Code to empower a
judge to reduce a manifestly excessive contractual penalty clause or to
increase manifestly inadequate liquidated damages. 14 2  The legislature
amended the article again in 1985 to permit adjustment on the judge's own
motion. 14 3  These amendments provided judges with great discretion in
appropriate cases to revise a damages clause agreed to by the parties. 1 "
In 1975, the same year as the first amendment to article 1152, the
European Council exercised its role of setting the political agenda for the
European Union by approving a preliminary program of consumer protection
and information. 14 5 This and subsequent programs "served as a basis for an
ever growing corpus of directives and regulations in the area of consumer
protection," reaching approximately ninety directives by 2015.146
139 See, e.g., supra notes 20-22.
140 See supra notes 29-48 and accompanying text.
141 See Maxeiner, supra note 76, at 131 (referring to the timing of a European resolution on
unfair terms).
142 See supra note 30.
143 See supra note 30.
144 A court cannot adjust a contractual penalty unless it has determined that the penalty is
manifestly excessive, the standard for which is influenced by academic commentary and
decisions of the Cour de cassation. Calleros, supra note 30, at 105-06. However, once that
determination is made, the court appears to have broad discretion in determining the
appropriate adjustment of the penalty; although in most cases, the court will preserve some
portion of the penalty agreed to by the parties, even if reduced. Id. at 106-07.
145 Council Resolution of April 14, 1975, 1974 O.J. (C 92) [hereinafter Preliminary
Programme], http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:C:1975:092:FULL
&from=EN.
146 Euro. Parl., Consumer protection in the EU, Policy Overview § 1.3.1, at 4-5 (Sept. 2015)
[hereinafter Policy Overview], http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2015/
565904/EPRSIDA(2015)565904_EN.pdf. By the time it announced its 1975 program, the
EU had already taken a number of actions and issued directives relating to consumer
protection, beginning in the early 1960's. Preliminary Programme, supra note 145, app. I at
12, app. 2 at 13-16. A common criticism of EU consumer legislation is fragmentation:
adopting numerous measures that separately address narrow issues. See Policy Overview,
supra note 146, § 3.2, at 12. For recent developments in EU consumer protection, see,
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The most important of these directives for the Sresent topic is the 1993
Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contractsl4 which directed Member
States of the EU to enact national laws providing that non-negotiated unfair
terms in a consumer contract are not binding on the consumer, 148 and that
written terms must be drafted in plain, intelligible language.1 49 In article 3,
the directive set forth a general definition of unfair terms and referred to an
annex of specific types of contract terms that EU member states would be
permitted to deem unfair:
1. A contractual term which has not been individually
negotiated shall be regarded as unfair if, contrary to the
requirement of good faith, it causes a significant imbalance in
the parties' rights and obligations arising under the contract, to
the detriment of the consumer.
3. The Annex shall contain an indicative and non-exhaustive
list of the terms which may be regarded as unfair.s0
Article 4.2 limited the universe of unfair terms, however, to auxiliary terms:
Assessment of the unfair nature of the terms shall relate neither
to the definition of the main subject matter of the contract nor
Norbert Reich, Party Autonomy and Consumer Arbitration in Conflict: A "Trojan Horse" in
the Access to Justice in the E.U. ADR-Directive 2013/11?, 4 PENN. ST. J.L. & INT'L AFF. 290
(2015); Rafal Manko, European Parliamentary Research Service, Contracts for supply of
digital content: A legal analysis of the Commission's proposal for a new directive (May
2016), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2016/582048/EPRSIDA(2016
)582048_EN.pdf; Eur. Parl. Directive 2011/83, 2011 O.J. (L 304) 64 [hereinafter Directive on
Consumer Rights], http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.L.2011.3
04.01.0064.01.ENG&toc=OJ:L:2011:304:TOC (requiring information from vendors about
products, and-in distance or off-premises sales-establishing fourteen-day withdrawal
period for consumers); Commission Staff Working Document, http://ec.europa.eu/justice/con
sumer-marketing/files/ucpguidance en.pdf.
147 EU DiR. 93/13, supra note 35 (amended in ways not relevant to the current topic in EU
Directive on Consumer Rights, supra note 146, art. 32). Unlike EU Regulations, directives set
forth legal outcomes, leaving the details of implementation to Member States. See supra note
29. Accordingly, directives "can be transposed into national law differently." Policy
Overview, supra note 145, at 5; see also TWIGG-FLESNER, supra note 29, at 19.
148 EU DiR. 93/13, supra note 35, art. 6.1.
149 Id. art. 5.
150 Id. art. 3. The EU took a similar, though not identical, approach in a directive in 2005,
by defining unfair commercial practices and then presenting a list of clauses that were deemed
to be unfair "in all circumstances." Eur. Parl. Directive, 2005/29, art. 5, 2005 O.J. [L 149]
[hereinafter Directive on Unfair Commercial Practices], http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/
LexUriServ.do?uri-OJ:L:2005:149:0022:0039:en:PDF.
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to the adequacy of the price and remuneration, on the one hand,
as against the services or goods supplies in exchange, on the
other, in so far as these terms are in plain intelligible
language."'
French lawmakers implemented this directive by enacting article L. 132
of the French Consumer Code.15 2 Article L. 132-1 (1) declared that unfair
terms are void, (2) defined as unfair a term in any contract between a
professional and either a consumer or other non-professional that creates a
significant imbalance in the rights and obligations to the detriment of the
consumer or non-professional, (3) authorized the Council of State (Conseil
d'Etat) to issue decrees listing types of clauses that must be regarded as
unfair, (4) included an annex with an illustrative and non-exhaustive list of
terms that may be regarded as unfair in light of all the terms and
circumstances of the contract, and (5) provided that the evaluation of unfair
terms could not involve the main purpose of the contract or the price or other
compensation for goods or services, so long as the terms were written
clearly.1 5 3  Article L. 132-2 delegated to a "Commission des clause
abusives," within the Ministry of Consumer Affairs, the task of identifying
abusive terms, 154 with article L. 132-1 providing that the Council of State
will issue its decrees on the advice of the Commission.15
Article L. 132-1 of the French Consumer Code exceeded the minimum
requirements of the directive by regulating all consumer contracts,156 as
"s EU DiR. 93/13, supra note 35, art. 4.2.
152 C. CONS. art. L.132-1 (Fr. 2005). See supra note 33 (referring to new location of this
provision in the reformed Consumer Code). Article L. 132-1 was not a novelty to the French
law, but an extension and updating of the Scrivener Law of 10 Jan. 1978. EVA STEINER,
FRENCH LAW: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH 302 (2010).
153 C. CONS. art. L. 132-1 (Fr. 2005) (Act no. 95-96 of 1 February 1995 art. 1, annex to the
Journal officiel of 2 Feb. 1995). Article L. 132-1 does not include the EU Directive's
reference to "good faith"; however, the Directive's mention of good faith was not intended to
add a second requirement beyond a showing of significant imbalance. Maxeiner, supra note
76, at 134-35.
14 C. CONS. art. L. 132-2 (Fr. 2005).
15 C. CONS. art. L. 132-1, sent. 2 (Fr. 2005). A decree in 2009 issued lists of both
rebuttably presumptive unfair clauses (gray list) and conclusively unfair clauses (black list).
D6cret no 2009-302 du 18 mars 2009 portant application de Particle L. 132-1 du code de la
consummation, https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXTO00020
4141 00&categorieLien=id.
156 The first line of an English translation of art. L. 132-1 omits any requirement of a
standard-form or non-negotiated contract: "In contracts concluded between a business and a
non-business or consumers, clauses which aim to create or result. . . ." C. CONS. art. L. 132-1
(Fr. 2005, Eng. ed.).
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permitted by the directive, 157 rather than just ones of adhesion. Moreover, it
empowered French judges to assess fairness under the standard of significant
imbalance, which is roughly as broad as the concept of substantive
unconscionability. 158 Article L. 132-1 represents a modest departure from
post-revolutionary regard for personal autonomy and distaste for a strong
judiciary because judges are guided by legislative and administrative lists of
possibly abusive terms. 159  Further, French law allows a judge to ask the
Commission des clause abusives for a non-binding opinion on an allegation
of an unfair contract term in judicial proceedings.160
A less restricted delegation of judicial power can be found in the French
Commercial Code provisions regulating transactions between
businesspersons or business entities.161  Article L. 442-6, I of that Code
imposes liability on a person or entity in business who:
1. obtains or attempts to obtain from a business partner an
advantage of any sort that ... is manifestly disproportionate to
the value of the service provided....
2. subjects or attempts to subject a business partner to
obligations that create a significant imbalance in the rights and
obligations of the Parties;
157 The twelfth paragraph of the findings in the preamble to the directive contemplates
elevated national laws on just this issue:
Whereas, however, as they now stand, national laws allow only partial
harmonization to be envisaged; whereas, in particular, only contractual terms
which have not been individually negotiated are covered by this Directive;
whereas Member States should have the option, with due regard for the
Treaty, to afford consumers a higher level of protection through national
provisions that are more stringent than those of this Directive ... ;
EU DIR. 93/13, supra note 147, at 95/30. Article 8 of the Directive more generally authorizes
member states to adopt more consumer-protective implementing legislation than the minimum
harmonization required by the Directive. Id. art. 8; Maxeiner, supra note 76, at 133-34.
158 See supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text.
159 In 2016, for example, a French appellate court applied a provision of the list of
presumptively unfair clauses to strike down a forum selection clause in a Facebook adhesion
contract. Arret Du 12 Fevrier 2016, Cour D'Appel de Paris, Ch. 2, RG Nol5/08624, pp. 5-6.
161 Article L. 132-3 of the Consumer Code provided for reference of cases to the
Commission by "the minister for consumer affairs, or by approved consumer protection
associations," or-more broadly-by "interested professionals." C. CONS. art. L. 132-3 (Fr.,
Eng. ed., 2005). By regulation, a "competent judge" could ask the Commission for its opinion
"upon the occasion of proceedings [in which] the unfair nature of a contractual term is
alleged." C. CONS., REGULATORY PART - COUNCI OF STATE DECREES, Art. R. 132-6 (Fr.,
En. ed., 2005).
See supra notes 38-40.
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4. obtains or attempts to obtain, under the threat of a sudden
severance of business relations, clearly abusive conditions
concerning the prices ... that do not arise from the obligations
of purchase and sale. 16 2
The second prohibited action in article L. 442-6 mirrors the significant-
imbalance test in article L. 132-1 of the Consumer Code and article 1171 of
the reformed Civil Code. A Commission, the CEPC, issues
recommendations regarding commercial practices but has not issued a list of
contract terms that should be prohibited under the significant imbalance
standard and has not otherwise provided original guidance on that
standard. 1 63
Unlike the Commercial and Consumer Codes, article 1171 of the
reformed Civil Code empowers judges to identify and regulate a significant
imbalance without a direct tether to administrative or legislative examples of
prohibited or problematic provisions or to administrative recommendations
regarding contractual provisions.'6 Granted, when adjudicating an article
1171 claim, one might expect judges to consult the administrative guidance
specifically tied to the Consumer and Commercial Codes, when it might
provide general guidance for applying article 1171. Nonetheless, the
absence of a direct link to administrative guidance appears to loosen the reins
on judicial application of the significant-imbalance test in article 1171.
In another way, article 1171 straddles both the Consumer Code and the
Commercial Code because it applies to contracts between any types of
contracting parties, whether consumer contracts or ones between
professionals. At the same time, however, it is more restrictive than both
because article 1171 applies only to adhesion contracts.1 65
162 Raworth trans., supra note 38, at 436-39; C. coM. art. L. 442-6 (Fr. 2015).
163 See supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text. Although a court can refer an issue to the
CEPC, the CEPC will publish its analysis only after the court has issued its decision. C.
CoMm. L. 440-1 IV. That procedure is consistent with the CEPC reporting on court decisions
rather than issuing its own original interpretations of the statutory standard. See supra note 44
and accompanying text.
i6 Cf supra notes 36-42.
165 Article 1171 begins with the phrase "Dans un contrat d'adhesion, toute clause" C. CIV.
art. 1171 (Fr. rev. 2016). The translation invited by the Ministry of Justice translated this
phrase to "[alny term of a standard form contract." REFORM IN ENGLISH, supra note 15, at 14,
art. 1171. In turn, the new Civil Code defines "contrat d'adhesion" in the following way: "Le
contrat d'adhision est celui dont les conditions gdndrales, soustraites a la ndgociation, sont
ddtermindes 6 l'avance par I'une des parties." C. cIv. art. 1171 (Fr. rev. 2016). The invited
translation translates this provision to: "A standard form contract is one whose general
conditions are determined in advance by one of the parties without negotiation." REFORM IN
ENGLISH, supra note 15, at 3, art. 1110, sent. 2. In their footnote 5, the translators add this
2892017]
GA. J. INT'L & CoMP. L.
The most notable difference between these three articles is the provision
in both the reformed Civil Code and in the Consumer Code that excludes the
balance of the price and main obligation from scrutiny, a limitation not
present in the assessment of significant imbalance in the Commercial Code.
Indeed article L. 442-6 specifically refers to two prohibited commercial
practices that relate to the price or main obligation: seeking an advantage that
is manifestly disproportionate "in light of the value of the service
rendered" 66 and threatening a break in commercial relations to obtain clearly
abusive conditions "concerning prices."'67  These companion provisions,
combined with the absence of textual restriction on the Commercial Code's
assessment of significant imbalance, leave no doubt that article L. 442-6
provides judges with broad discretion to assess significant imbalance
regarding any term of a commercial contract. Moreover, unlike article L.
132-1 of the Consumer Code and article 1171 of the reformed Civil Code,
article L. 442-6 of the Commercial Code can be enforced by government
officials as well as other interested persons. 6 8
In sum, principles of freedom of contract still hold a central position in
the reformed Civil Code,1 6 9 and indeed have a constitutional dimension in
France.1 70  Nonetheless, qualifications in the Civil Code's statement of
freedom of contract 7 1 "suggest a compromise position that supports an
express freedom of contract only to the extent that it is 'controlled.' "172
C. Assessing Article 1171
When viewed in context, article 1171 comes into focus as part of a natural
evolution in French law rather than an aggressive vanguard of a revolution.
In the context of the general consumer protection movement in Europe 7 3 and
clarification: " 'Standard form contract' translates contrat d'adhision, more literally 'a
contract to which one adheres' and whose conclusion therefore involves no or little choice."
Id. n.5.
166 C. COM. art. L. 442-6, 1 l (Fr. 2015), translated in Raworth, supra note 38, at 436.
167 C. COM. art. L. 442-6, I 40 (Fr. 2015), translated in Raworth, supra note 38, at 436.
Compared to the first example, this one arguably is less telling, or at least less clear, because it
refers to abuses not arising from the obligations of purchase and sale. See supra note 162 and
accompanying text. Nonetheless, regulation of an oppressively high or low price under
subsection 4 appears to be consistent with subsection 2, which more generally regulates a
si nificant imbalance in the main obligations.
& C. coM. art. L. 442-6, III (Fr. 2015).
169 See supra note 127.
170 Mekki, supra note 46, at 1203.
171 See supra notes 137-39 and accompanying text.
172 Mekki, supra note 46, at 1202.
173 See supra notes 145-46 and accompanying text.
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the predecessor statutes in the French Consumer and Commercial Codes,174
extending the regulation for significant imbalance to a more central position
in the Civil Code seems perfectly appropriate. Moreover, article 1171
accomplishes this extension in a cautious manner, restricting its application
to auxiliary terms (unlike the Commercial Code) and to adhesion contracts
(unlike both the Consumer Code and the Commercial Code).
French judges have not engaged in excesses when exercising their powers
under flexible standards, such as those in the Consumer and Commercial
Codes, 175 and the relatively restrictive scope of article 1171 invites continued
judicial moderation. Although the significant-imbalance standard leaves
room for judgment in its application, it is more explicitly descriptive of this
policing function than the term "cause"176 and arguably more objectively
precise and descriptive than the term "unconscionability."l7 7  Moreover,
although article 1171 is not expressly tied to administrative lists of
potentially unfair clauses, regulations accompanying the Consumer Code can
provide general guidance for novel applications of a significant imbalance
standard, reducing the risk of surprising judicial applications.
Indeed, one may wonder whether the inclusion of article 1171 in the
reformed Civil Code is largely symbolic in light of how much of its work is
already performed by the Consumer and Commercial Codes.178  It could
supplement those codes by addressing challenges to ancillary terms in
contracts between two nonprofessionals, or by encouraging judges to find
significant imbalance in clearly meritorious cases in novel contexts, even in
the absence of specific guidance from regulations to which the Consumer
Code is tethered.1 79 Beyond that, locating the text of article 1171 within the
Civil Code could help establish the regulation of significant imbalance as a
more central principle of French law, 80 one that helps to moderate its general
174 See supra notes 152-68.
175 See, e.g., Mekki, supra note 46, at 1200-01 (referring to studies on this topic).
176 See supra notes 19-24.
177 See Ghirardelli, supra note 108, at 768-69 (for a "clear definition of unconscionable
terms," proposing the significant imbalance standard).
178 See Amaro, supra note 22, at 5, § 2.
179 Prior to the 1993 EU Directive and its implementation in the French Consumer Code, for
example, the Cour de cassation famously found a term to be void for unfairness, even though
the term did not appear among those few identified by a regulatory agency acting pursuant to
the predecessor to article L. 132-1, the Scrivener Law of 10 Jan. 1978. Lorthioir, Minit Foto
v. Boucheron, Arret du 14 mai 1991, Bulletin des arrits de la Cass. civ. Ire, no. 153, discussed
in STEINER, COMPARATIVE APPROACH, supra note 152.
Is See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
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principles of freedom of contract.'8 1  Because its reach is modest, it sends
that message in a manner that is more evolutionary than revolutionary. 182
Indeed, the scope of the provision is arguably modest to a fault. Two
features merit separate assessment: the limitation of article 1171 to adhesion
contracts and the exclusion of assessment of the price or other compensation
for the main obligation.
1. Adhesion Contracts
An early draft of article 1171 applied broadly to any contract, regardless
whether negotiated or adhesion in nature, but it also required a challenge
based on significant imbalance to be raised by the party seeking relief.'83
The final version omits the requirement that a challenge be raised by a party,
thus permitting the judge to raise an issue of significant imbalance on the
judge's own motion, but it restricted article 1171's application to adhesion
contracts. 8 4
The changes made for the final version are appropriate. Restricting the
application to adhesion contracts eases fears that the law will disturb the
results of active bargaining between parties,'s while in fact excluding very
few consumer contracts.'8 6 Moreover, permitting judges to act on their own
motion greatly reduces the risk that a party will waive a meritorious claim
181 See supra note 127 (Civil Code provisions on freedom of contract, with limitations); see
also Amaro, supra note 22, at 8, § 16 (referring to those who defend judicial intervention as a
check on excesses of freedom of contract).
182 See Mekki, supra note 46, at 1194 ("Although the presentation of general principles is
somewhat innovative, overall, the project is quite moderate and does not present a revolution
of ideas.").
183 Amaro, supra note 22, at 5 (setting forth the French language text of article 77 of the
Reform, an early draft of article 1171 of the new Civil Code). In the translation invited by the
Ministry of Justice, this early text read: "A contract term which creates a significant imbalance
in the rights and obligations of the parties to the contract may be struck out by the court on the
request of the party to the contract to whose detriment it is stipulated. The assessment of
significant imbalance must not concern either the definition of the subject matter of the
contract nor the adequacy of the price in relation to the act of performance." (Translated by
Bdn6dicte Fauvarque-Cosson, Simon Whittaker & John Cartwright).
184 See supra note 18 and accompanying text.Iss See, e.g., Amaro, supra note 22, at 7, § 10 (criticizing the early draft of art. 1171 for
covering even negotiated contracts); Maxeiner, supra note 76, at 160-62 (describing the
successful advocacy of German scholars for restricting the 1993 EU Directive to non-
negotiated terms, reasoning that the effect on autonomy and freedom of contract is greatly
deendent on this factor).
6 See supra note 85; see also Maxeiner, supra note 76, at 130-31 (1976 European
resolution and explanatory memorandum focused on problems caused by adhesion contracts).
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because of ignorance of the law, inability to pay the legal costs of mounting a
challenge, or commercial retaliation. 18 7
Nonetheless, judges applying article 1171 will be faced with difficult
questions when presented with a standard form contract whose terms were
dictated solely by a business, with the exception of a consumer's choice
between several printed options on terms unrelated to the issue of significant
imbalance. Is that an adhesion contract or one that was subject to
negotiation, albeit to a minor degree?
Moreover, the 1993 EU Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer
Contracts showed that a law can nimbly regulate unfair terms that are not
subject to negotiation, even if the entire contract is not an adhesion contract:
"A contractual term which has not been individually negotiated shall be
regarded as unfair. ... "8 In the reformed Civil Code, by contrast,
negotiations over the price of goods could prevent article 1171 from
protecting a party from operation of a draconian auxiliary clause. To strike a
sensible middle ground between a statute that applies to both negotiated and
adhesion contracts, as do the Consumer and Commercial Codes,18 9 and the
current text of article 1171, a minor revision in article 1171 could mirror the
approach taken by the EU Directive: it could regulate any unfair terms that
were imposed without possibility of negotiation by a party with greater
bargaining power. Such a term would retain article 1171 's moderate scope
while avoiding embarrassing questions about the minimum level of
negotiation that would take an entire contract out of the range of judicial
scrutiny under article 1171.
2. Exclusion of Significant Imbalance in the Main Obligation
Both article L. 132-1 of the Consumer Code and article 1171 of the new
Civil Code exclude price and main obligation from their coverage, consistent
with the 1993 EU Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts.190
contrast, some courts in the United States have applied the unconscionability
187 Amaro, supra note 22, at 8, § 15; see also Maxeiner, supra note 76, at 136, n.163 (with
respect to national laws implementing the EU Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer
Contracts, European Court of Justice held that courts must raise challenges to unfair clauses
on their own motion, noting that lawyers' fees may be higher than the amount at stake). On
the other hand, the new Civil Code somewhat reduces the risk of waiver for these reasons by
authorizing approved consumer associations to bring suit on behalf of consumers with regard
to events that adversely affect the collective interests of consumers. C. civ. art. L. 421-1 (Fr.
rev. 2016).
188 EU DIR. 93/13, supra note 147, art. 3.1.
189 See supra notes 156 (Consumer Code), 162 (Commercial Code).
1 See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
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doctrine to consumer contracts in which a trader has extracted a highly
inflated price for the main obligation of goods or services, such as one in
which a door-to-door salesman persuaded a low-income couple to buy a solar
water heater at a highly inflated price.'91
One rationale for the more limited scope under articles L. 132-1 and 1171
is the degree to which a party has the opportunity and the ability to assess
various kinds of terms dictated by the other party, coupled with legal
protection against aggressive sales methods. Ideally, consumers should be
aware of the nature of goods or services offered by a professional and the
price quoted for them, and they should be able to reject an unattractive offer
and take their business to a competitor. The consumer should not worry
about negative future consequences stemming from such an action.1 9 2
Consumers need protection mostly from abusive auxiliary terms to which
they might pay little attention or have difficulty assessing the risks.1 9 3
Although a trader might succeed in extracting an inflated price from a
consumer through high-pressure sales tactics, such as the door-to-door sales
in illustrative cases from the United States,' 9 4 European law offers generous
withdrawal periods for such contracts as well as other protection from
aggressive sales tactics.195
This rationale begs the question why article L. 442-6 of the Commercial
Code protects a commercial party to a greater degree, without limitation on
the nature of the term that is challenged.1 96 Professor Amaro offers this
further explanation: unlike a consumer, a small business might deal regularly
with a much larger enterprise that dominates a specialized market, an
enterprise on whom the small business depends for supply, sales, or services.
In those circumstances, the small business might accept oppressive terms in a
negotiated contract to maintain the necessary relationship with the firm that
has much greater bargaining power. Small business owners might have a
great interest in avoiding such oppressive terms but could fear commercial
retaliation if they challenge the terms in court. A broad regulation of
191 Maxwell v. Fid. Fin. Servs., Inc., 184 Ariz. 82, 907 P.2d 51 (1995).
192 See supra note 124.
193 Amaro, supra note 22, at 6, § 6; Leff, supra note 110, at 350; see also supra note 105.
194 Maxwell v. Fid. Fin. Servs., Inc., 184 Ariz. 82, 907 P.2d 51 (1995); Jones v. Star Credit
Co., 298 N.Y.S.2d 264 (1969).
195 See, e.g., Directive on Consumer Rights, supra note 146 (maximum harmonization
directive mandating national laws requiring vendors of goods and services to supply
designated information, and providing for fourteen-day withdrawal period for consumers in
distance or off-premises sales); Directive on Unfair Commercial Practices, supra note 150
(mandating national laws against misleading, aggressive, and harassing commercial practices,
and undue influence).
196 See supra notes 161, 165-66 and accompanying text.
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significant imbalance, even in negotiated contracts, helps to remedy the
consequences of commercial dependency. Additionally, government
enforcement helps to distance small businesses from assertion of legal
positions that might rupture their relations with necessary commercial
partners.1 97
Article 1171's exclusion of price and main obligation from scrutiny for
significant imbalance represents a reasonable compromise between absolute
freedom of contract and maximum protection of weaker parties. It does not
create a significant gap in coverage, yet it stands out as a declaration of
moderation, helping to alleviate fears that article 1171's appearance in the
Civil Code is "frightening"' 9 8 and might drive international traders to prefer
other national laws to govern international transactions.
3. A Comparative Assessment ofJudicial Power
To explore a final point of comparison between French judicial application
of article 1171 and unconscionability analysis in the United States, one can
consider the feminist analysis of AddlaIde Remiche, who has critiqued the
"imagined judge," or "the judge as he or she is represented in a specific legal
culture."1 99 Remiche characterizes the "imaginary representations" conveyed
by French and U.S. legal cultures in the following ways: "The French
imagined judge is, in broad terms, a knowledgeable automaton mechanically
applying the law entirely created by the Parliament, while his or her American
counterpart is a decision maker well equipped to solve social problems."200
Further, she believes that stereotyped associations between masculinity and the
exercise of power might explain in part why proportionally, France has twice
as many female judges than the United States.20 ' Perhaps men are not drawn
to the seemingly non-powerful role of magistrate in France, explaining why
70% of test-takers for that position are women. Conversely, gendered
stereotyping has historically played a role in the proportionately lower
appointment of women to the obviously powerful role of judging in the United
States.202
197 Amaro, supra note 22, at 6, § 6.
198 See EBA, supra note 16.
199 Remiche, supra note 48, at 96.
200 Id.; see also id. at 99 ("[T]he former is a 'knowledgeable automaton' and the latter is a
'powerful actor.' ").
201 Id. at 95.
202 Id. at 99-107; see also id. at 108-09 (the gender effect is replicated in other common law
and civil law countries); Nikolaus Benke, Women in the Courts: An Old Thorn in Men's Sides,
3 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 195 (1995).
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The notion that the French judges do not make law, at least in some
limited fashion, is a fiction.20 3 French judges at all levels are adding
meaning and texture to the Civil Code with every interpretation and
application of general legislative text to specific disputes.20 The French
judiciary's participation in lawmaking certainly is not as open and far
ranging as the fashioning of common law rules in the United States,205 nor
does it have the force exerted by the legislative interpretation of an appellate
court in the United States, which binds lower courts within the relevant
jurisdiction under the doctrine of stare decisis.20 6 Nonetheless, lower courts
and advocates in France do pay heed to previous decisions of appellate
courts, not as binding precedent but as persuasive authority,20 7 particularly if
203 See Remiche, supra note 48, at 109; Anthony Chamboredon, The Debate on a European
Civil Code: For an "Open Texture, " in THE HARMONISATION OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW 75-
81 (Mark Van Hoecke & Frangois Ost ed., 2000) (discussing French legal method, from its
historical roots and stereotypical ideal to reality).
204 See, e.g., Chamboredon, supra note 203, at 87 (arguing that this type of judicial
participation in refining the law should not be viewed as foreign to the civil law); DAWSON,
supra note 131, at 399, 416-31 (tracing the debate about the legal force of French jurisprudence);
MITCHEL LASSER, JUDICIAL DELIBERATION: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL
TRANSPARENCY AND LEGITIMACY 30-61 (2004); UGo MATTEI, COMPARATIVE LAW &
EcoNoMIcs 84 (1997); STEINER, supra note 46, at 75; Mitchel Lasser, Judicial (Self-)Portraits:
Judicial Discourse in the French Legal System, 104 YALE L.J. 1325, 1344-55 (1995)
[hereinafter Lasser, Portraits] (discussing modem theory that French judicial decisions create
"legal norms" even ifthey do not amount to an official source of law). Although the Napoleonic
Code prohibited judges from deciding cases by issuing general regulations, supra note 48, it also
threatened prosecution ofjudges who refused to adjudicate a matter for lack of specific direction
in legislation. C. cIv. art. 4 (Fr. 2015).
205 Justice Mosk said of the common law,
The inherent capacity of the common law for growth and change is its most
significant feature. It is constantly expanding and developing to keep up with
the advancement of civilization and the new conditions and progress of
society, and adapting itself to the gradual changes in trade, commerce, arts,
inventions, and the needs of the country... . The vitality of the common law
can flourish if the courts remain alert to their obligation and have the
opportunity to change it when reason and equity so demand.
Stanley Mosk, The Common Law and the Judicial Decision-Making Process, 11 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 35 (1988).
206 Compare STEINER, supra note 46, at 76, 79-82 (no formal system of stare decisis in
France), with State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20 (1997) ("[lIt is this Court's prerogative
alone to overrule one of its precedents."), and Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 233 (2009)
(explaining that stare decisis applies with special force to previous interpretations of statutes,
because Congress can correct judicial error).
207 See, e.g., STEINER, supra note 46, at 80-82, 97; Lasser, Portraits, supra note 204, at
1350-51.
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a judicial position has been followed in other cases 208 or is supported by
209
academic writings.
The new Civil Code invites a reassessment of the role of the judiciary in
France. Judges will continue to refrain from issuing quasi-legislative
decrees, and the legislative and executive branches will continue to act as the
primary actors in fashioning and reforming laws.210 In short, political
questions will be left to the other branches of government. French judges at
all levels, however, have long performed a role that is substantial and
challenging. With each application of a general code provision to novel,
specific facts, they give life to and shape the law.2 11 They add to the law in
its interstices, where legislative text requires interpretation, and their case
law receives ultimate approval only when codified. However, the reform's
very act of codifying previous case law 2 12 shows that courts had been
participating in the process of filling gaps in the original Code.
The power to apply the significant imbalance standard can safely be
entrusted to the French judiciary, as a means of helping to implement the
legislative limits to freedom of contract.213 It provides just enough flexibility
to allow the judiciary to shape the law through application to specific types
of clauses, thus helping to add certainty to the law, rather than undermining
it.2 14
IV. CONCLUSION
The addition of the significant imbalance standard to the Civil Code,
along with the power to exclude an unfair term from a contract, will not
introduce imbalance into the French legal system. It reflects the modern
evolution of controls on freedom of contract and the gradual increase in
208 See, e.g., DAWSON, supra note 131, at 409; STEINER, supra note 46, at 87-88 (discussing
the concept of "jurisprudence constante, whereby a particular interpretation or principle is
revated in a series of decisions").
See generally STEINER, supra note 152, at 299 ("Encouraged by scholarly writings, French
courts have been able to create a body of substantive rules aimed at providing a greater degree of
balance in contractual obligations."); RENt DAVID, FRENCH LAW: ITS STRUCTURE, SOURCES AND
METHODOLOGY, at xi-xii, xiii-xiv (Michael Kindred trans., 1972) (the persuasive authority of
French judicial decisions can grow with academic study and evaluation).
210 See supra notes 133-34; see also Chamboredon, supra note 203, at 95-97 (judicial
participating in lawmaking must take place within constraints).
211 See supra note 204.
212 See supra notes 10-12.
213 See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
214 See Chamboredon, supra note 203, at 88 (recommending these qualities for a flexible
standard).
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judicial intervention21 5 since the distrust of the judiciary in the aftermath of
the French Revolution.2 16
The experience in the United States provides an interesting contrast.
Although Americans are more resistant to legislative and administrative
regulation than are Europeans,217 judges in the United States exercise power
more openly and unapologetically.2 18 Nonetheless, with some exceptions the
unconscionability doctrine has stalled when the legal and political culture
lost enthusiasm for controls on freedom of contract to avoid abuses.2 19
The time is ripe for more freely and openly acknowledging the
appropriate power that the French judiciary exercises in France with
integrity, professionalism, and appropriate restraint, so that it can assume its
place as a full partner in the battle against abusive contract terms, including
in the application of the significant-imbalance standard. At the same time,
Americans should more fully embrace the way in which administrative
regulations can work in tandem with judicial review of contracts for unfair
terms. 220  As a more specific and authoritative guide than the official
comments to the U.C.C., administrative regulations could guide judges in the
application of the unconscionability doctrine, providing a basis for making
the "attitudinal adjustment" 221  necessary for robust policing of
unconscionable terms and contracts.
215 See, e.g., supra note 179.
216 See supra notes 131-36.
217 See Paul D. Carrington, Unconscionable Lawyers, 19 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 361, 369 (2002)
(contrasting the use of regulatory bureaucracies in other developed countries with the
preference for private litigation in the U.S. because of Americans' distrust of government).
218 See supra notes 205-06 and accompanying text.
219 Compare supra notes 96-99 (retrenchment in unconscionability doctrine and failure of
reasonable expectations doctrine), with supra notes 140-68 (tracing European and French
laws in the last half century that protect weaker parties in a compromise with freedom of
contract); see also Allen R. Kamp, Downtown Code: A History of the Uniform Commercial
Code 1949-1954, 49 BUFF. L. REv. 359, 419-24 (2001) (tracing the evolution of the
unconscionability provision of the U.C.C., from one that would empower judges to police for
fairness, balance, and reasonableness, to the more constrained unconscionability standard,
based on concerns about interference with freedom of contract); Jane K. Winn & Mark
Webber, Impact of EU Unfair Contract Terms Law on U.S. Business-to-Consumer Internet
Merchants, 62 Bus. LAW. 1, 3 (2006) ("[Dluring the 1980s ... the U.S. embraced more
market-oriented approaches that required individuals to bear more risk in consumer
transactions, while the EU embarked on a sweeping program of legislation to protect
consumers from many of those risks."); cf Ziegler, supra note 29, at 397 (criticizing European
agroach for excessive paternalism and praising more market-based approach in the U.S.).
See supra notes 108-26 and accompanying text.
221 See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
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